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I. INTRODUCTION
F irst, let me extricate myself from that impossible title in the program.
"Morality, Equity, Comity and Sodality in the D.C. Circuit." Oh, my.
Obviously judges who accept speaking invitations a year ahead are like
Scarlett O'Hara; they'll think about it tomorrow. All I can say is that at
the time I probably thought it provided a lot of maneuvering room. But in
T.S. Eliot's words, "Between the idea And the reality, Between the
motion And the act, Falls the Shadow."1 For the past month or so, I have
been grappling with the shadow. As a result, what I am going to talk
about tonight are some of the problems an appellate judge faces, in
making and changing law in one of our busiest and most controversial
circuits, at a time of transition for both the court and the country.
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
** This paper was delivered, in a slightly different form, as the Thirty-Fifth Cleveland-
Marshall Fund Lecture.
1 T.S. ELIOT, THE HOLLOW MEN v (1925).
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I would like to begin with a little recent history about the D.C. Circuit.
When I was appointed by President Carter in 1979, I was not only the
first woman to serve on the court, but the first new appointee in ten years,
junior to three Nixon appointees (JJ. Robb, MacKinnon and Wilkey), and
five Kennedy and Johnson appointees (JJ. Wright, McGowan, Leventhal,
Tamm and Robinson). Judge Bazelon, a towering figure on the court for
over 30 years, had just taken senior status. Within less than a year, I was
followed by three more Carter appointees (JJ. Mikva, Edwards and Ruth
B. Ginsburg) and one of my colleagues died unexpectedly (J. Leventhal).
During the next five years, three more judges took senior status (JJ.
McGowan, Robb and MacKinnon), another died (J. Tamm), one retired to
become an ambassador (J. Wilkey), and a twelfth judge was authorized.
Since 1983, President Reagan has appointed eight new judges to the court
(JJ. Bork, Scalia, Starr, Silberman, Buckley, Williams, D. H. Ginsburg
and Santele). Justice Scalia was, of course, subsequently appointed by
President Reagan to serve on the United States Supreme Court. Thus, in
my seven and one-half year tenure, the court has gone from nine to
twelve judges, only one who was there when I came is still active. Eleven
new appointments have been made, and there have been three Chief
Judges. Last summer, a relative stripling, I became the fourth.
The flow of membership in the D.C. Circuit during this period has been
more like what one would expect in Congress, with elections every few
years, or in the Executive; shifting its key policymakers with every
administration. It surely cannot be what the Framers of the Constitution
had in mind when they gave federal judges life tenure. Hamilton called
the tenure guarantee "the best expedient which can be devised in any
government to secure a steady, upright and impartial administration of
the laws. '" 2 Yet, in recent years federal courts have been turning over at
a dizzying rate,3 which plainly impacts the steadiness of judicial action.
Law is regularly being made, unmade, and remade.
A recent article by my colleague Judge Edwards uses a series of
computer runs from the court's 1983 term to make out a statistical case
that our members mostly agree with each other and do not fall into
predictable "conservative," "liberal," or even "moderate," voting blocks;
labels that the press so dearly loves to pin on us. 4 I agree that our votes
2 A. HAMILTON THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 227 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield ed. 1966)(em-
phasis added).
' The frontpiece of a recent Federal Reporter shows that 112 of the 155 active circuit
judges, and 403 of the 554 active district court judges have been appointed since 1977. Thus,
2 Presidents are responsible for over 70% of the ekurrent active federal district court and
court of appeals judges. Between 1970 and early 1085 there were a total of 46 resignations
by federal district and appellate judges. Jay, The World According to Judge Posner, 73 GEO.
L.J. 1507, 1516 n.66 (1985)(reviewing R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CouRTS: CRIsIs AND REFORM
(1985)).
I See Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of Judging: Dispelling
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in a large number of cases, particularly administrative law cases,5 do not
so easily typecast us. I do, however, think that in the high visibility cases,
involving controversial social or "moral" issues, our differences in judicial
philosophy, on the proper role of the courts in a democratic society, do
emerge front and center. I also believe that some judges have definite
"agendas" for changing the law in certain areas, such as restricting
access to the federal courts, and that they diligently pursue these agendas
at every opportunity. It is clear that important aspects of our circuit
jurisprudence are changing with our changing membership. How this
happens on a day-to-day and case-by-case basis in a circuit court of
appeal, and how active or restrained a role an appellate judge legiti-
mately plays in accelerating or resisting change, is the real subject of my
remarks tonight. In preparation, I have reviewed our cases for the
1984-85 "term" and will use that time period for the most part to make
my points. 6
II. THE JUDGE IN CIRCUIT
A. Circuit Precedent: Changing It
One commentator has described "Itihe majesty of judicial decisionmak-
ing [as being] the accommodation of change within a framework of
stability. Our society requires both, and asks of judges a sensitive
accommodation of the two."7 During periods when the court's member-
ship changes rapidly and new members bring new ideologies and philos-
ophies to their judicial role, we look to a life-tenured judiciary to apply
past precedent to curb too rapid change,8 and to maintain the stability of
the law. But the use of precedent in circuit court jurisprudence leaves
much room for judgment, and it is this process on which I want
particularly to focus today.
Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619 (1985). Judge Edwards found
that in the 1983-84 term of our court, more than 94% of the D.C. Circuit's decisions were
without dissent. Id. at 629. By contrast, only 25% of the Supreme Court's decisions for the
same period were unanimous. Id. at 630.
Similarly, my colleague Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg points out that the D.C. Circuit's
94% rate of unanimity is slightly below the national average of 96%. See Ginsburg, The
Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205, 212 nn. 35-36 (1985).
' In fiscal year 1985, (July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985) 71% of the new cases filed in the
circuit involved direct review of agency action or civil appeals from district court decisions
involving the government as a party; 20% of the cases involved private civil action, and 4%
were criminal appeals. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL COURT
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 1985 2 (1985)[hereinafter COURT STATISTICS].
6 See supra note 5. During the fiscal year 1985 our court issued 300 published opinions.
7 Bennett, Judicial Activism and the Concept of Original Intent, 69 JUDICATURE 219, 221
(1986).
s For a general discussion of the stare decisis principle, see Stevens, The Life Span of a
Judge Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 1-9 (1983).
1986]
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Theoretically, of course, circuit judges are bound by circuit precedent
until it is overruled either by the circuit court itself, sitting en banc, or by
the Supreme Court. Indeed, we are fond of pointing this out in defense of
our opinions when we do follow circuit precedent.9 In practice, however,
it is not quite that tidy and all precedent is not fungible. Our court turns
out around 300 printed opinions a year lo and our body of circuit precedent
contains tens of thousands of opinions. Inevitably, they are not all
consistent.11 Some may seem outdated or running counter to more recent
' In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 780 F.2d 59, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1985), for example,
the court noted that:
It may be true that the consequences of this holding, in the present case and in
many others, will be to compel the Commission to reject innovative certification
proposals that benefit some customers while leaving others at least no worse off.
But since that is always the effect of Panhandle [Eastern Pipeline Co. v. FERC,
513 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980)], it is an
argument for overruling the case rather than interpreting it. Whatever its merits,
Panhandle is the law of this circuit, and we are required to follow it unless and
until it is reversed by the court en banc.
Subsequently, the court voted to en banc the "Panhandle issue." 780 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir.
1986). See also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1985), (Judge McGowan, writing
for the majority, pointing out that Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
which Judge Bork attacked in his dissent, will remain the law of the circuit until en banced,
and that Congressmen, therefore, had standing to challenged President pocket veto), vacated
as moot sub noma. Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987).
10 See supra note 6. In the 12 month period ending June 30, 1985, the D.C. Circuit
published 300 opinions. However, our output is on the low side. According to the Annual
Report of the Administrative Office, during that twelve month period we disposed of 489
appeals, the lowest of all circuits. The Ninth Circuit disposed of over 2,000; the Fifth, 1700;
the Eleventh 1800; and the Sixth 1700. COURT STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 26. Several of these
circuits have roughly the same number of judges as does D.C.; the common wisdom is that
our cases are much more complex. As the Federal Judicial Center concluded:
The results of the study demonstrate that the administrative agency cases, and
to a slightly less extent, the U.S. civil cases, often confront the D.C. Circuit with
massive sets of material for judicial action. Agency cases involve, on the average,
five lawyers and five briefs. They are more likely than other case types to involve
an intervenor or amicus brief, long aggregate records on appeal, and protected,
motion-filled postdisposition periods.
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE CASES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT at xii (1982).
11 In Aluminum Co. of Am. v. FCC, 761 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1985), for example, Judge
Scalia lamented that "[w]e need not resolve here the apparent conflict in the expression of
our cases on the question whether in the course of an appeal for an agency decision applying
a rule to a specific set of facts, we may entertain a challenge to the rule itself after the
jurisdictional deadline for direct review of the rule has expired." Id. at 751 (citing two 1977
cases in conflict).
Justice Stevens has explained, in the content of Supreme Court decisionmaking that "as
the body of precedent continues to grow year after year, the likelihood that doctrinal
inconsistency may force the Court to reject one precedent in favor of another must likewise
increase." Stevens, supra note 8, at 4.
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss4/3
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jurisprudential trends in the circuit 12 or in the Supreme Court.13 Some-
times, different lines of precedent based on quite different premises
coexist uneasily for years without actually colliding, and the judges will
follow those precedents which they like best. 14 Ultimately, however, an
occasion arises where a precedent directly conflicts with the way a judge
wishes to decide a case and she is confronted with a more direct dilemma.
1. When to En Banc
When a judge finds precedent dead set against the way she thinks the
case should go, she usually accedes to it, albeit reluctantly. 15 Sometimes,
12 See e.g., Reynolds Metal Co. v. FERC, 777 F.2d 760, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Scalia, J.)("a
prior decision of this court-albeit much earlier than the clear pronouncements of [recent
cases]... allowed mandamus for the very reason here requested.... If the intervening cases
left any doubt that that decision has been limited to its particular facts, the present opinion
should eliminate it").
"3 See e.g., California Human Dev. Corp. v. Brock, 762 F.2d 1044, 1052 (D.C. Cir.
1985)(Scalia, J., concurring)(taking majority to task for citing pre-Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821 (1985) circuit precedent to show that there was law to apply in reviewing the
agency's allocation of appropriated funds under the International Trade Protections Act).
" A classic example of this is the conflict between the circuit's opinions in Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); and Action for
Children's Television ("ACT") v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Home Box Office,
issued on March 25, 1977, the court laid down strict rules regarding agency treatment of ex
parte contracts during informal rulemaking that involves competitive interests. Nonethe-
less, when the ACT panel issued its opinion on an almost identical problem five months
later, it refused to apply the teachings of Home Box Office. Technically, the ACT panel
explained that it was simply not applying the Home Box Office rule retroactively "inasmuch
as it constitutes a clear departure from established law." ACT, 564 F.2d at 474. But, the
panel made clear that its misgivings about the Home Box Office rule went much deeper. "If
we go as far as Home Box Office does in its ex parte ruling... why not go further to require
the decisionmaker to summarize and make available ... their evening ruminations?...
[w]hy not administer a lie detector test ... ?" ACT at 477.
Indeed, the polarity of the two opinions was so extreme, that the Administrative
Conferences commissioned Professor Nathanson to draft a report on the whole subject
matter. See Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte Communications in
Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 AD. L. REV. 377 (1978). In the long run, however, the
dust usually settles and the court adopts one or another, or sometimes a middle approach.
See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1981)("Later decisions of this
court . . . have declined to apply Home Box Office to informal rulemaking of the general
policymaking involved here.").
" See e.g., Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 n. 7 (D.D.C.)(three judge
court)(granting standing to Congressman to challenge constitutionality of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act, and explaining that while "[T]wo judges of the Court of
Appeals, including a member of the present panel, have expressed disagreement with
[congressional standing] ... it has... been adopted by several panels of the Court of Appeals
and is the law of this Circuit"), affd sub. nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986);
Copper & Brass Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, 679 F.2d 951, 953
(D.C. Cir. 1982)(Ginsburg, J., concurring)(questioning validity of circuit precedent, but in
view of the clarity of its relevance, adhering to it). But see Crockett v. Regan, 720 F.2d 1355,
1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(Bork, J., concurring)("I do not consider myself bound by the panel
1986]
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however, she is so unhappy with the status quo, that she feels she must
strike a blow for change. She may acknowledge that circuit law points in
one direction but argue that the direction is no longer true. She may point
out that the Supreme Court has intimated or even ruled that the
precedent is wrong, 16 or that our own more recent precedent suggests
premises or considerations different from those on which the old prece-
dent was based.17 Or, the judge may state her own reasons for being
dissatisfied with what was until now clear circuit precedent and urge a
change, 1s
Given her strongly-held views, in what procedural form can the judge
express them? She can protest, point out the precedent's deficiencies,
advance a better alternative, document support for it, and finally, albeit
regretfully, follow the precedent. Or she can strongly dissent and let it go
at that. But in my experience, judges, however "restrained" in theory, are
often not content to let it go at that. Sua sponte, or at the instigation of a
litigant,19 they vote to en banc the case and overrule the bothersome
precedent.
There may, however, be pragmatic reasons why an obviously frustrated
judge will not follow the en banc route. First, en bancs on a ten to
twelve-judge court normally take an inordinate time to schedule, let
alone decide. Almost invariably, at least on our court, they produce
multiple opinions and postpone disposition of the case for months,
decision in [two recent cases, since they] purported to change the law ... in this circuit
without submitting the issue to the full court."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984).
16 See e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Bork, J., dis-
senting)("With a constitutional insouciance impressive to behold, various panels of this
court, without approval of the full court, have assumed that we have jurisdiction to
entertain lawsuits about governmental powers brought by congressmen against Congress
or by Congressmen against the President. That jurisdiction floats in midair. Any founda-
tions it may once have been thought to possess have long since been swept away by the
Supreme Court."), vacated as moot sub noma. Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987). See also
supra nn. 9 & 15.
17 See Ashley Enter. Ltd. v. Weitzman, Dym & Assoc., 780 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1986)(Edwards, J., concurring)(a case decided by the circuit in 1974 "represents an
unexplicable and unwarranted divergence from established case law in this Court ... an
aberrant judgment that is flatly wrong ... no attorney would be well advised to rely on [it]").
15 See cases cited supra note 15.
'9 This is likely to happen when our circuit is in the minority on an issue that other
circuits have decided differently. Two recent en banc decisions in the circuit are illustrative:
Foster v. U.S., 783 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(en banc)(adopting "waiver rule" whereby
defendant who unsuccessfully moves for judgment of acquittal under FEe. R. CRaM. P. 29,
and in the course of presenting his defense further implicates himself, has no right to
appellate review of the Rule 29 motion based only on the evidence the government had
introduced at the time of the motion); Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir.
1986)(en banc)(relation of FOIA to IRS confidentiality statutes), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 947
(1987). Panel members in the course of these decisions decided that the current circuit
position on certain key issues was wrong and should be reviewed en banc.
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss4/3
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sometimes years. 20 As a result, en bancs are not undertaken lightly; the
initiating judge must feel deeply that circuit jurisprudence is signifi-
cantly threatened to call for an en banc. 2' In the words of my colleague
Judge Mikva:
Law differs from some other human endeavors . . . in its
inhospitability to constant revision .... For a host of familiar
reasons, it is important that legal disputes, once settled by the
courts, generally stay settled. In the ordinary run of things,
judges promote neither justice nor the general welfare by re-
hearsing old arguments whenever they feel a tingle of uncer-
tainty. Absent exceptional circumstances . . . courts [should]
avoid redeciding old controversies; we are as likely to mess things
up as we are to straighten things out.
22
That said, there are judges, (fortunately only a few) who, as a point of
honor, seek to en banc every case they lost at the panel stage. But most
judges are content to reinforce their original panel dissents with a
symbolic vote for rehearing by the panel, and to ration their en banc votes
carefully. 23
20 For instance, there was an average period of almost one year in the last three en banc
decisions between argument and disposition compared to an average 3.9 months for a
published panel opinion.
21 See supra note 16. In 1984, the D.C. Circuit received 244 petitions for rehearing en
banc, roughly 47% of our decided cases. National Classification Comm. v. United States, 765
F.2d 164, 172 n.1, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Separate Statement of Wald J.). Yet, during that
period a rehearing en banc was granted in only five (2.4%) of the requested cases.
22 Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 768 F.2d 1500, 1514 (D.C. Cir.
1985)(Mikva, J., dissenting), vacated, 776 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
23 See e.g., Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant, 774 F.2d 1180 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)(Statement of Judge Wald pertaining to her reasons for not calling for en banc
consideration, which citing the infrequency of trademark litigation in circuit and already
extremely limited judicial resources). Even when panels deny rehearing they often make
minor changes sua sponte. One of ourjudges on occasion issues lengthy responses defending
the original decision against the arguments raised by the petition for rehearing. See e.g.,
Utah Power & Light Co. v. ICC, 764 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (MacKinnon, J.)(eleven page
response); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post, 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(MacKinnon,
J.)(nine page statement denying petition to panel for rehearing). The legal status of such
supplemental statements as precedent is dubious, especially where all of the panel majority
do not subscribe.
There is yet another technique for limiting possible readings of a panel opinion. In King
v. Palmer, No. 84-5750, (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1986), a majority of the court subscribed to Judge
Bork's Statement accompanying a denial of the suggestion for rehearing en banc, on the
ground that:
Rehearing of [the question whether Title VII affords a claim for relief for
sex-based discrimination to a woman who alleges that she was denied a promotion
in favor of another woman who had a sexual relationship with their supervisor] en
banc would be inappropriate because no party challenged that application of Title
VII on appeal, and the issue was not briefed or argued to the panel. Indeed, the
1986]
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More critically, the judge may not have the votes to en banc the
precedent,24 and denial of an en banc will only strengthen its authority.
In that case, reluctantly concurring or strongly dissenting, he may
determinedly aim his opinion towards the Supreme Court which he
believes to be more receptive to change than his own court. This is a
time-honored technique. My old boss, Judge Jerome Frank, in the Second
Circuit, successfully used it many times. 25 In our circuit, a judge's
well-documented plea for change may also find fertile ground in Con-
gress. With prodding from litigants and their Washington lawyers,
Congress will sometimes legislate our opinions out of existence by
amending the laws we have "misinterpreted."26 Finally, by ventilating
losing parties' petition for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing en bane again
did not raise that issue. Because the point was not before the panel on appeal,
there is no occasion to address the issue en banc and we regard the question as
entirely open should it arise in a future case.
Id.
24 It takes "a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active
service" to en bane a case. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)(Supp. III 1979). The D.C. Circuit has
interpreted this to mean that a recused judge automatically counts as a "no" vote since she
cannot vote to en banc. See Cooper & Brass Fabricators Council, Inc., v. Department of
Treasury, 679 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982). But see Arnold v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d
899 (4th Cir. 1983)(disqualified judges do not count in computing majority), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1040 (1984). Thus, in the D.C. and most other circuits, where several judges are
recused, there may be an insufficient number of judges apart from the panel majority to en
banc the case even if they all vote yes. This nearly happened in Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Comptroller of the Currency, 765 F.2d 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Statement of Scalia, J., joined
by Bork, J., and Starr, J.), affd in part and revd in part sub nom. Clarke v. Securities Indus.
Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987). Apart from the panel members, only one other judge on the
court voted not to en banc.
25 See R. GLENNON, JERoME FRANK: ICONOCLAST As REFORMER 178-79 (Cornell Press,
1985)(Frank often criticized the effects of the precedents he said he was compelled to follow).
For instance, in U.S. v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956), affd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), he
followed earlier precedent on obscenity but fastidiously pinpointed what he perceived as
constitutional problems posed by those decisions under the First Amendment. R. GLENNoN,
supra at 111-12, 178-79.
25 See, e.g., American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 778 F.2d 850, 860 n.17 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)("lf the reality has changed since [Congress' enactment of the statute], it is up to
Congress-not the courts-to modify the statute").
Frequent use is made of D.C. Circuit dissent and majority opinions in legislative
histories. For example, in reenacting the Equal Access to Justice Act, Congress explicitly
rejected the narrow interpretation of the term "substantially justified position" that the
circuit had adopted in Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1908 (1984), and advanced the position expressed by the dissent in Del Manufacturing
Co. v. United States, 723 F.2d 980, 986-89 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(Wald, J., dissenting). See also
Equal Access to Justice Act Amendments, H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. liat n.
19 (1985).
Another example is Congress' reaction to the split between the circuits in interpreting the
interplay between the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. In "proposing
legislation to clarify and restore the law on this point," the Committee
specifically rejected the interpretation set forth in the decisions of the Fifth and
[Vol. 34:477
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his contrary views, a judge may contribute to an ongoing dialogue in the
treatises or law reviews, or even influence another circuit to reconsider
the same issue. 27 Any or all of these motivations may explain a judge's
attack upon circuit precedent even when he does not call for an en banc.
My experience, however, is that the most serious attacks on circuit
precedents generally involve an attempt to en banc the case. 28
This makes sense, for there is something troublesome about simulta-
neously following and savaging a circuit precedent. Although it may be
viewed as merely planting the seeds for a future harvest when member-
ship on the court changes, the tactic has a definite destabilizing effect on
circuit jurisprudence. The precedent that has been attacked remains
alive but wounded; perceptive litigants will henceforth argue that the
precedent is in disrepute and must be confined to its precise facts. The
precedent is tarnished in the eyes of judges and litigants. The court, over
time, may reflexively distinguish it or begin to ignore it.
Broadside attacks on existing precedents also tend to highlight doctri-
nal and ideological splits in the court and invite cynical observations
from litigants and commentators about different law emanating from
different panels. For all these reasons, I believe it generally preferable,
for a judge who feels an important precedent is wrong, to bite the bullet
and try to get it overruled by an en banc. If she prevails, the circuit
Seventh Circuits, in the new Justice Department regulations, and in the amended
Department regulations, and in the amended OMB guidelines. The understand-
ing of the relationship between the two laws that was found to be applicable in
Greentree [v. U.S. Customs Service, 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982)] and Porter [v.
Department of Justice, 717 F.2d 787 (3rd Cir. 1983)] . . . is reflective of the
congressional intent when the Privacy Act was passed.
H. R. No. 726, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1984).
Similarly, after the D.C. Circuit held that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could not
make an operating license immediately effective in the face of an outstanding hearing
request even if it had determined that the Amendment involved "no significant hazard
consideration," Sholly v. NRC, 651 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1980), vacated, 459 U.S. 1194 (1983),
Congress changed the statute to reject that reading. Pub. L. No. 97-415 § 12, 96 Stat. 2067,
2073-74 (1983).
27 Often judges, like prophets unheeded in their own circuit, are more persuasive
elsewhere. See, e.g., Santistevan v. Loveridge, 732 F.2d 116, 119-120 (10th Cir. 1984)(adopt-
ing analysis used by Wald, J., concurring in Lawrence v. Acree, 665 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
21 In Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 2153 (1985), the court dealt with the question of whether the District of Columbia's
six month notice of claims requirement applies to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and other federal
damage claims against the District. While the Brown appeal was pending, another panel of
the court decided McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983), which held that the local
time limit did apply to federal damage actions. Given the clarity of the precedent, the Brown
panel, including Judge Wright, affirmed the dismissal of the damage claims. 704 F.2d 1293.
Yet, unhappy with the McClam precedent, the full court granted rehearing en banc, and in
an opinion authored by Judge Wright, overruled McClam.
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jurisprudence is cleared of the underbrush of discredited precedents.
Thus, a two-tiered jurisprudence consisting of "good" and "bad" precedent
is avoided. If she fails, the precedent will have been rehabilitated at least
for the moment.
Traditionally in our courts of appeals, the en banc process has been
utilized to test the correctness of new precedents, as soon as they are
issued. What is novel in our circuit right now, perhaps more than in any
other circuit, is the increasing resort to en bancs to overrule venerable,
heretofore respected circuit precedents. The shift is plainly a symptom of
the rapidly changing makeup of the court.2 9
The final dilemma of a conscientious judge seeking to en banc a
distasteful precedent occurs either when he fails to muster a majority of
the court for the en banc rehearing30 or, worse yet, if he manages an en
29 For instance, in 1986 two of our en bancs involved attempts to change precedents that
were several years old. See supra note 19.
Between 1971 and 1979 there were a total of 61 en bancs in the circuit, an average of
between seven to eight per year. It was a turbulent decade (eight of those en bancs were
Watergate-related), but the court's membership remained stable during that entire period.
In the last seven terms, 1980-87, we have heard or are scheduled to hear 49 en bancs,
certainly not a precipitous rise overall. Note, however, that thirty-two of those forty-nine en
bancs arose in the last four years. Last term alone (1985-86), we heard nine en bancs.
Furthermore, the most recent en bancs have sharply divided the court. See infra note 32.
Rehearing en banc "is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when
consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions,
or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." FED. R. APP. P.
35(a). At times, however, a judge may feel that although the issue is not of momentous
importance for circuit law, the result is so unjust to the litigants that she calls for an en banc
to flag the case for colleagues or the public. This tension between justice for individual
litigants and maintenance of the integrity of circuit law pervades many aspects of a judge's
daily labors.
30 There is a mini-en banc device known as the Irons footnote (Irons v. Diamond, 670
F.2d 265,268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) in our court which has become appreciably more popular
in the last year or two. Because only a full en bane court can overrule a panel opinion and
because some obsolete or unpopular precedents are just not important enought to elevate to
full scale briefing and en banc argument treatment, a panel may draft an opinion
overruling a prior precedent and circulate it to the full court, highlighting what it is doing.
If the court agrees, it will then be noted in the opinion that the former precedent is no longer
valid. The Irons footnote treatment is supposedly reserved for minor annoyances in circuit
precedents and in the last few years, it has been used frequently. E.g., Telecommunications
Research and Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 75 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 496 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hobson v.
Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 16 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985); Londrigan
v. FBI, 722 F.2d 840, 845 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
On a few occasions, however, the full court decided that the issue was important enough
to merit full en banc treatment (briefs and argument) rather than a quick pass. Oddly
enough we are still undecided whether it takes only a majority of the court to authorize an
Irons footnote or whether any objecting judge can send the case to a regular en banc
procedure. Since no law or rule requires that an en banc be briefed or argued, it is probably
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banc but the vote on the merits goes against her. The question then
becomes whether she should take her jurisprudential lumps and with-
draw or continue the attack in future opinions. Most judges have a
healthy sense of when "enough is enough" so that, having made their
position clear, they do not become perennial irritants to their col-
leagues. 31 But some are indefatigable and nothing is likely to silence
their most profoundly-held convictions. Whether successful or unsuccess-
ful in en bancing their target precedents, they maintain their stand
sufficient to get a majority of judges, although collegiality suggests not going that route if
any significant number disagree.
A rising number of Irons footnotes is another signal of a changing jurisprudence. There
is a danger, surfaced by two recent cases that started out as Irons footnotes and ended up as
fully briefed and argued en bancs, that a court will not fully recognize the import of what
it is doing without going the advocacy route, and will change meaningful precedents too
casually. See supra note 19.
It is also possible for a merits panel to overrule a prior decision by the motions panel in
the very same case. Motion decisions, unless they announce otherwise or are issued as
published decisions are considered preliminary. See, e.g., Asarco v. FERC, 777 F.2d 764, 773
n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1985). ("The disposition of motions panels may of course be reexamined during
the merit panel's indepth consideration of the case.").
Sometimes, too, a judge's gripe is with the doctrine developed-not the result in a case,
and although a court could en banc a case solely for its rationale, it is seldom likely to do so.
In this regard, Judge Bork's crusade to abolish the doctrine of equitable discretion in
assessing Congressmen's standing from our jurisprudence is instructive. In his thirty page
dissent in Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41-71 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated
as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987), he chronicled the history of his own
as well as the circuit's alleged past mistakes in recognizing the standing of Congressmen
who claim dilution of their official authority. He argued for a doctrine that rejects any
standing of members of one branch of government to go to court to protect their official
authority under statutes or the Constitution. In so doing, he repudiated his own earlier
concurrence in Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied 104 S. Ct.
91 (1983), in which he argued based on past circuit precedent, for a rationale that would
permit standing only for total abrogation of a Congressman's vote. He also confessed to
endorsing the equitable discretion doctrine in American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Pierce,
697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982), but attributed it to oversight due to the emergency nature of
the case. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 44 n.2 ("the opinion was released one day after the oral
argument."). Since Judge Bork concurred in the result in Vander Jagt and Pierce, he
had not previously asked for an en banc, pointing out that Barnes was the first case in which
the misbegotten doctrine affected the result. "Unlike those [cases] in which similar
protests have been lodged, the error in analysis [in this case] produces an error in result."
759 F.2d 41.
"' The prime example of this is, of course, Justices Brennan's and Marshall's practice of
dissenting whenever the Supreme Court upholds a death penalty sentence, or denies
certiorari in a case imposing the death penalty: "Adhering to our view that the death
penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant
certiorari and vacate the death sentence in these cases." See, e.g., Booker v. Wainwright,
106 S. Ct. 339 (1985); Yates v. South Carolina, 462 U.S. 1124 (1983).
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inside and outside the court. Doggedly, often artfully, but nonetheless
relentlessly, they press their colleagues.3 2
Perhaps the most effective antidote against profligate en bancing is the
very human desire ofjudges to coexist in peace. Apart from the inordinate
demands on the time and resources of judges, en bancs heighten tensions
on the court. No judge likes to have her opinions en banced, and although
she may expect it from those with whom she frequently disagrees, she
may resent it from usual allies. Some judges do indeed regard a vote in
favor of en bancing their cases as tantamount to betrayal. Especially on
a divided court, we are thus tempted occasionally to rationalize voting
against an en banc of one of our colleagues's opinions for purposes of
collegiality ("It's not that important, I can distinguish the opinion in the
future if I have to"). Perhaps too, we fear that the fate of our own future
opinions may be implicated in a weakening of collegial bonds. A cursory
study of close en banc votes suggests judges here fall more readily into
recognizable voting blocs than Judge Edwards' survey of panel voting.
This is not by any means always true.33 For myself, I have found that
the force of these subjective concerns can be resisted; the integrity of the
circuit's law is my paramount concern. I have also learned that judges'
regard for their colleagues survive individual case differences, even en
banc votes. And in fact a judge's early expression of anxiety or disagree-
32 For examples of this type of practice in the D.C. Circuit, see Vinson v. Taylor, 760
F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir.)(Bork, Scalia, and Starr, JJ., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc)("The artificiality of the approach we have taken [to include sexual
harrassment in the definition of Title VII discrimination] appears from the decisions of this
circuit . . . the court has held [that] bisexual harassment, however blatant and however
offensive and disturbing, is legally permissible .... If it is proper to classify harassment as
discrimination.., that decision at least demands adjustment in subsidiary doctrines."). The
panel's decision was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson,106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986). see also Del Mfg. Co. v. United States, 723 F.2d 980,989 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)(Wald, J., dissenting)("Even if the main battle has been lost... in this circuit, the
wiping up operations performed by the present ruling are unnecessarily thorough to my
thinking.")
Sometimes even victory in the Supreme Court does not ease the committed judge's
burden. For example, since his dissent in Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
rev'd 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985), which was vindicated in the Supreme Court, Judge Scalia has
had mixed results in his effort to advance his theory of the unreviewability of some areas of
agency discretion. Compare International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855 (D.C. Cir.)(successfully apply-
ing doctrine in a decision issued before the Supreme Court's decision in Chaney to bar
review of Department of Labor's refusal to pay training costs under the Trade Act of 1974),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 81 (1985), with California Human Dev. Corp. v. Brock, 762 F.2d 1044,
1052-53 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Scalia, J., concurring)(arguing that in a post-Chaney case the
majority should hold that agency's allocation of funds is committed to agency discretion by
law).
33 See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.)(JJ. Wright, Tamm, Wilkey,
Ginsburg, Bork, Scalia and Starr voting not to en banc case that found no constitutional right
to homosexual conduct in military), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (1984).
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ment with a respected colleague's opinion may alert her to the imminent
danger of an en banc and provoke a change in the panel opinion itself that
makes a vote for an banc ultimately unnecessary. On at least two
occasions, I have myself extensively modified a panel opinion because I
took seriously the early warnings of sympathetic colleagues.34 Further-
more, even if an en banc does materialize, it is usually preferable to being
reversed by the Supreme Court, since en banc in one's court is a process
over which one retains some control through participation in the ultimate
consensus or at least the accommodation of that consensus to one's
dissent.35
En bancing remains the most direct and the most legitimate way to
overrule a bad precedent. But it is not always possible, given the posture
of the case,36 the makeup of the court, or the limited energies of its
members which hold down the number of en bancs each year to less than
a dozen. In a time of transition, such as the D.C. Circuit is now enduring,
we can expect mounting discontent with old circuit law, which is unlikely
to level off as long as revisionist judges have realistic hopes of convincing
" See Illinois Cities of Bethany v. FERC, 670 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Gray Panthers
v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
A recent case demonstrates, however, that a modification of a panel opinion can have
quite an opposite effect. In Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 730 F.2d 816 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), Judge Bork held, for a unanimous panel, that FERC was not duty bound under
the circumstances of that case to hold hearings to investigate a utility's allegation that the
rate FERC had set for it was unconstitutionally confiscatory. The utility's suggestion for
rehearing en banc was denied, and in fact no member of the court voted to en banc the case.
The panel, however, concluding that the utility "presented persuasive new arguments
suggesting that the [panel opinion] was in error" decided to issue a new opinion. Jersey
Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 768 F.2d 1500, 1501 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 776 F.2d 364
(D.C. Cir. 1985). This time a majority of the panel, over a strenuous dissent by Judge Mikva,
held that FERC was in fact required to hold a hearing on the utility's allegations. Judge
Mikva began his nine page dissent by proclaiming that "[tlhis case demonstrates the
importance of leaving well enough alone." Id. at 1505. On October 18, 1985, the court
decided to vacate the second panel opinion and rehear the case en banc. The full court
concluded, with fourjudges dissenting that FERC's summary rejection of the utility's claims
was inconsistent with "controlling precedent of the Supreme Court and of this court," and
therefore vacated the Commission's decision and remanded for a hearing. No. 82-2004, slip
op. at 4 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1987)(en banc).
31 In virtually all of the en banc opinions issued in the 1984-85 term, there were
sprightly exchanges between the majority and minority positions, and the majority opinions
were clearly influenced by the dissents. See e.g., Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498
(D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc)(seven to four decision), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073 (1985); Ollman
v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (1984)(en banc)(seven separate opinions), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985).
36 Several times, cases en banced have become moot before decision. See, e.g., Gott v.
Walters, 756 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 791 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In such a case, of
course, the original panel decision has already been vacated so that the jurisprudence
reflects at least the tentative majority opinion that it was vulnerable. Of course, en bancs
occasionally do affirm the original panel opinion.
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new colleagues, converting swing votes, or persuading the Supreme
Court or Congress. It remains to be seen whether such an activitist
attitude toward changing precedent will prove to be ultimately good or
bad for our substantive jurisprudence. Time, however, is likely to
counteract its temporarily destabilizing effects. As the majority of the
court supporting a particular point of view enlarges, it becomes easier to
deal with problem precedents by using full scale en bancs, the so-called
Irons footnotes37 (our mini-en bancs accomplished by vote without
briefing or argument), or by distinguishing them away. Thus, eventually
the pendulum swings back -toward a more stable-if different-body of
circuit precedent. In the interim, though, the tides of jurisprudential
battle, reflected not only in en banc rulings of the court, but in frequent
attacks upon precedent in panel concurrences and dissents, will continue
to shift with the shifting membership of the court.
2. When to Distinguish or Limit a Precedent
Thus far I have discussed the situation where circuit precedent
controls. Much more frequent, however, is the situation where there are
no "red cow" cases squarely on point, but rather only cases that indicate
circuit approval of a certain approach to certain issues, an acceptance of
certain premises, or sometimes a mode of analysis that logically applies
to the instant case even though it requires some extension of an old
precedent to new facts. Here there is obviously much greater room for
judges to maneuver around old law. I'm sure it is no surprise that
opinions by certain judges in particular areas of the law are studiously
evaded by certain other judges within the same circuit. The old theory
that pursuing legislative history is like looking over a crowd and picking
out your friends, carries over to precedent-searching in the West reporter
system. Reasoning by analogy-the lifeblood of appellate law-gives
judges space for selecting the cases they like or selecting out the cases
they don't. Many opinions of yesterday, whose tone or spirit are not
acceptable to newer judges today, can be ignored, or distinguished away
if not precisely on point. This sorting out process is generally healthy,
because courts, like other social institutions, reflect the passions, convic-
tions, even the obsessions of their time. As the times, and the state of our
collective knowledge and experience change, rationales that once re-
flected prevailing wisdom lose force.
A primary example of this is Judge Wright's landmark opinion last
year in Quincy Cable TV,38 invalidating the FCC's "must carry" rules
that required cable TV stations to carry local TV programming. Invoking
the first amendment, the panel found that the rule's rationale, based
3' See supra note 30.
31 Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2889 (1986).
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upon the scarcity of TV outlets no longer has a "place in evaluating
government regulation of cable television" 39 due to the proliferation of
new outlets that now permit relatively free access to the airwaves. The
FCC's "collective instinct" that "must carry" rules were essential to
preserve local programming did not merit deference, given changed times
and advanced technologies.40 As a post-script, the panel's decision was
enthusiastically welcomed by that agency which sought neither rehear-
ing en banc nor certiorari.
Every judge wants to exorcise some past cases, believing them no
longer valid in today's context. In general, the older the precedent, the
more acceptable this selective process. 41 But nowadays in our court, this
kind of "cabining in" sometimes occurs surprisingly soon after issuance of
the opinion.42 Unpopular precedent will be distinguished away or "lim-
ited to its facts" in its infancy with severe doubts left as to its ability to
survive.43
Courts have always reasoned by analogy to past precedent or distin-
guished it. Judges honestly differ about whether the facts distinguishing
one case from another, despite common principles, are material enough to
justify or even dictate a different result.44 But when judges are engaged
39 Id. at 1449.
40 Id. at 1457-58.
41 See supra notes 17 and 19 and accompanying text.
42 In Samuels v. D.C., 770 F.2d 184, 201 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1985), for example, the court
pulled back from the doctrine that the Housing Act gives an implied right of action or third
party beneficiary standing to tenants for violation by landlords. In so doing, the court was
forced to draw fine distinctions between the case before it and the circuit's quite recent
decision recognizing third party beneficiary standing in Ashton v. Pierce, 716 F.2d 56 (D.C.
Cir.), modified, 720 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
41 Sometimes backing away from recent precedent is unavoidable due to intervening
events. This is especially true in diversity cases where the job of the federal courts is to
follow state law. See, e.g., Norwood v. Marrocco, 780 F.2d 110 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(recent
decision of District of Columbia Court which took away precedential effect of previous D.C.
Circuit opinion interpreting D.C. law); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 876 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)(certifying question of asbestos insurer's liability to Indiana court despite circuit
precedent on precise point because it had become clear that pattern of State court decisions
had changed since earlier decision).
At times the change necessitating reevaluation is legislative. In Trailways Lines, Inc. v.
ICC, 766 F.2d 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1985), for example, Judge Starr held that an earlier precedent
requiring the ICC to conduct a study of the implications for bus competition before awarding
new courses, Trailways, Inc. v. ICC, 673 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1982), was no longer relevant
precedent, reasoning that the intervening passage of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act did
away with the necessity for the study since the legislation did not require it. Trailways, 766
F.2d at 1543.
4 One example of this kind of legitimate difference appeared in Reuber v. United
States, 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984). A prior case, Zerilli v. Evening News Assoc., 628 F.2d
217 (D.C. Cir. 1980), had refused to permit an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)(conspiracy to have federal
officials disclose information obtained in violation of the Constitution), against a newspaper
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in more than a neutral inquiry into the present application of past
precedent, the process tends to lose objectivity and the result to be
dictated by personal reactions. Within our circuit, it is generally easy to
tell when a distinction expresses principled disapproval or a simple
distaste of the earlier case.
Thus, in United States v. Steele,45 a ruling, I hasten to add, from which
I dissented, and in which rehearing en banc was subsequently granted
with remand to the Commission in view of its charged function, the
majority invalidated a longstanding practice of the FCC to extend
preferential treatment to woman owner-managers of FM stations in
comparative license proceedings. An analogous preference for minorities
in license proceedings had been upheld by the court only months before
and certiorari denied. The FCC's underlying rationale in both cases was
that it was in the "public interest" to promote diversity of programming
through diversity of ownership. The Steele panel, however, finding the
FCC's rationale for the minority preference "more than a little implau-
sible,"46 declined to extend the rule to women on grounds that: "[W]hat-
ever the merit of these assumptions as applied to cohesive ethnic
cultures, it simply is not reasonable to expect that granting preferences
to women will increase programming diversity."4 7 I draw attention to the
original panel opinion, not to reargue the merits which subsequent
events have superceded, but to illustrate how disapproving judges may
seek to freeze recent precedent in its tracks, 48 and significantly to
that had allegedly conspired with government officials to infringe the plaintiffs civil rights.
The Reuber panel, with a separate concurrence by Judge Bork, distinguished Zerilli on the
basis that it held that no action was available in light of the "special factor" analysis laid
down by Bivens to guide whether cases should give rise to constitutional torts. Judge Bork
and I found no special factors counselling hesitation in this case, but Judge Starr dissented,
finding that there was no material difference in our case from Zerilli.
4- Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 84-1176, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Oct.
31, 1985). After rehearing en banc was granted, the FCC filed a motion for remand stating
that it had changed its position since its initial decision in Steele and that it no longer
believed it could constitutionally grant a racial or gender-based preference in comparative
licensing proceedings. The FCC's motion was granted and the case remanded to the
Commission for further consideration.
46 See Id. at 1198-99.
41 See Id. at 1199.
" I pointed out in my dissent that "[t]he view that such factors as race, sex or national
origin, which the individual is powerless to change, could not be a basis for awarding a
merit enhancement was expressed by several judges on the court ... but this view failed to
prevail tin TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986
(1974)]. Steele, 770 F.2d 1203, 1206 (Wald J., dissenting). The fact that this view failed in
TV 9 apparently presents no obstacle in the majority's view, to once again asserting it as
support for the conclusion that the Commission may not award merit on the basis of female
ownership and participation .... Id.
TV9 had been only recently invoked and validated in West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1392 (1985).
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undermine its rationale. 49 Unsettling as I find this practice, it is no
isolated event. Steele-type occurrences are likely to recur in any fast
changing and sharply divided court.50
3. The Invitational Dissent
In attacking precedent, a dissenter traditionally has a freer hand, since
he is not making law, only criticizing the law that has already been made.
His real audience is the rest of the court, Congress, or the Supreme
Court.5 ' Seven of the ten D.C. Circuit panel opinions which the Supreme
" As my dissent in Steele pointed out, there was no dispute that women were
underrepresented in radio station ownership. In addition, several reports of the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission had documented that "Women were most often portrayed as sex
symbols, wives or mothers," in "jiggly shows." Sexism was particularly rampant in the
media's portrayal of women in commercials, "[w]omen never leave the kitchen. They are in
there day and night."
The point of increasing ownership and participation of underrepresented
groups, such as minorities and women, is not to get some specific preordained
women's programming or black programming, but to ensure that the varying
viewpoints, perspectives, and issues of distinct relevance to these groups are fairly
represented in the media. As the majority quite correctly states, women are not
uniform in their choices of lifestyle, or their political, social or moral beliefs but,
I submit, neither are blacks. The point is not that these groups have some
cohesive, collective viewpoint. Certainly Phyllis Schafly and Eleanor Smeal differ
on most issues related to women; what they share, however, is their awareness
that women as a group are currently facing critical issues. The nexus between
diversity of control and diversity of content concerns such things as the selection
of topics for coverage in news, editorials, and programming, the emphasis
accorded to the issues, and the fairness with which the issues are presented, as
well as, the consideration given to the manner in which various groups are
portrayed in the media.
Steele, 770 F.2d at 1208-09 (Wald, J., dissenting).
10 The FCC's behavior in the Steele case merits comment. Despite the fact that the panel
opinion rested on the FCC's lack of statutory authority to grant a female preference, the
FCC did not ask for rehearing. In fact, a leading industry journal reported that the
"Commission had been content to have the [female] preference killed" and a "Commission
official said.., the agency is willing to live with the [panel] decision." Appeals Court Grants
Hearing of Women's Preference Issue in FM Grant, BROADCASTING, Nov. 11, 1985, at 74-75.
Several women's organizations did, however, petition for, and succeed in achieving
rehearing en banc.
Of course, the government clearly knows how to fight hard when it wishes to. In Schor v.
Commodities Future Trading Comm'n, 740 F.2d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1984), for example, a
panel initially held that the CFTC was without power to resolve common law counterclaims
in regulated brokerage accounts.They then sought certiorari which the Supreme Court
granted in order to vacate the case in light of Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Corp., 105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985).On remand, the panel reissued its original decision.
770 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The government again sought certiorari which was again
granted, and the Supreme Court reversed. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
51 There is no question that a forceful dissent significantly enhances the prospects of
obtaining an en banc or certiorari. Where the panel has been unanimous, other members of
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Court reversed in the 1984-85 term, had dissents whose reasoning was
adopted in varying degrees by a majority of the Supreme Court.52 In the
1985-86 Court term, at least one judge dissented from the original panel
opinion or from the denial of en banc in eight of the eleven cases granted
certiorari. 53
Making the case for change in a dissenting opinion has decided
the court with an opposing view frequently fill the gap by writing statements to accompany
the denial of rehearing en banc. See e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 739 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (JJ. Ginsburg, Scalia, and Starr, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc)(panel unanimously held that the military had the right to forbid the captain from
wearing a yarmulke while on duty). The panel's decision was subsequently affirmed by the
Supreme Court. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986). Although statistics show that 94 percent of our
decisions are unanimous at the panel level, see supra note 4, the most controversial and
visible decisions almost always have dissents. Further, I have been informed that a sharp
dissent provides useful fodder for the disappointed litigants when they seek relief in
Congress. See supra note 26. Additionally, it is not at all uncommon to see a dissenter
singled out for recognition in Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 827 (1985), rev'g 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
52 See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985), rev'g 709 F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(in which Bork,
J. concurred in part and dissented in part); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), rev'g
718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(Scalia, J., dissenting); Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Watt, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), rev'g 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(en banc)(in which
JJ. Tamm, Wilkey, MacKinnon, Bork, and Scalia, dissented); A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Federal
Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984), rev'g 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(in which Robb, J.
dissented); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Department of Agric., 467 U.S. 340 (1984), rev'g
698 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(in which Scalia, J., concurred in part and dissented in part);
Trout v. Lehman, 465 U.S. 1056 (1984), rev'g 702 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(in which
Mackinnon, J., concurred in part and dissented in part).
The three cases in which the Supreme Court reversed unanimous panels of this court
were: Lorion v. NRC, 470 U.S. 729 (1985), rev'g 712 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Johnson v.
Bechtel, 467 U.S. 925 (1984), rev'g 717 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1983); ITT World Communica-
tions v. FCC, 466 U.S. 463 (1984), rev'g 699 F.2d 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
11 Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 770 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(unan-
imous panel but unpublished dissent from denial of rehearing en banc), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
3245 (1986); American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Oberdorfer, J., sitting by designation and dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n
v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986); Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330 (D. C.
Cir. 1985)(JJ. Bork, Scalia, and Starr, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), affd,
106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986); Community Nutrition v. Young, 757 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir.)(unanimous
opinion), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2360 (1986); Catrett v. Johns-Manville, 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir.
1985)(Bork, J., dissenting from panel opinion), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); Paralyzed
Veterans of America v. CAB, 752 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(JJ. Bork, Scalia, and Starr,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2705 (1986); Shaw v. Library
of Congress, 747 F.2d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting from panel opinion),
rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986); Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 746 F-2d 1563 (D.C. Cir.
1984)(unanimous panel), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); International Union Auto. v.
Donovan, 746 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Scalia, J., dissenting from panel opinion), 106 S. Ct.
2523 (1986); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Bork, J., dissenting from panel
opinion), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Donovan, 766 F.2d 1550
(D.C. Cir. 1985)(Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1259
(1986).
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advantages. Foremost, a judge can write her dissent just the way she
wants; she need not defer to a colleague's sensibilities in order to gain a
needed vote. The dissenter can thus be an unabashed advocate. Unfortu-
nately, too many dissents take advantage of that license, freely using
hyperbole and distortion in challenging the majority. A most difficult
endeavor, incidentally, is to turn a dissent into a majority opinion on
those rare and satisfying occasions where the judge wins the dialectic
battle and persuades the swing member of the panel, or the author of the
draft original majority opinion, or even the en banc court. The responsi-
bility of formulating law for the circuit demands a different tone, the
conciliation of differing viewpoints, and the approval of other judges, in
contrast to the heady independence of dissent-writing.
The invitational dissent is, of course, not judicial news. The great
circuit court dissenters, Learned Hand, Jerome Frank and David Bazelon
have always played a "John the Baptist" role in the evolution of the law.
54
In times of transition, dissents can be expected to increase until the tide
has emphatically turned.55 The frequency of dissents also reflects the
confidence of the dissenters that they, not the circuit majority, are truly
in tune with the Supreme Court.
In our court, dissents come in all sizes and shapes. A dissent may be a
protest that the majority is not following circuit law, or a declaration that
the law has to be changed. Today, the dissents in our court tilt sharply
towards change. Some judges with agendas for change engage in lengthy
dissents that propose a new interpretation of past precedent or new
doctrine not based on any precedent, looking beyond our court to the
54 Sometimes it takes a dissenter a long time to establish his point. Robert Glennon's
biography of Jerome Frank recounts the saga of one such dissent which the Judge wrote
during my clerkship, United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951)(arguing against
the panel's reaffirmation of the "physical penetration test" in the Fourth Amendment). On
the first round, the Supreme Court took the case and affirmed the majority. United States
v. On Lee, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). Yet, Frank's dissent provided the fodder for additional
dissents by Justices Frankfurter and Burton. Frank's dissent also became the basis for a
later majority opinion by Justice Stewart in a different case: Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505 (1961). Further, Justice Brennan also used it in a dissent asking for the
overruling of the main precedent. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). Brennan's
opinion in turn was the basis for overruling the line of precedent in a still later case. Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See generally R. GLtEroN, supra note 25, at 181-82.
Similarly, in the area of harmless error, Frank dissented six times before the Supreme
Court finally took a case and upheld his position. See id. at 186-87.
55 In 1983, the court issued three hundred and fourteen published opinions, nineteen of
which (six percent) had accompanying dissents. In 1984, the court issued three hundred and
thirty-two published opinions, twenty-eight of which (eight percent) had accompanying
dissents. In 1985, the court issued three hundred published opinions, twenty-five of which
(eight percent) had accompanying dissents.
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Supreme Court for vindication.56 Chaney v. Heckler57 is a recent and
notable example of such a successful dissenting strategy. Judge Scalia's
dissent from the original panel opinion failed by one vote to gain en banc
rehearing, but was cited favorably several times in the Supreme Court's
reversal of the panel.
4. Raising Issues Sua Sponte
Ordinarily, appellate courts will not consider an issue that the parties
do not raise at trial.58 However, judges may raise jurisdictional issues sua
sponte even when the parties-often intentionally--do not. Many of these
jurisdictional issues involving access to courts and judicial review are
today priority items for judges who are prepared to forge new doctrine
even without the help of the parties. Threshold access issues such as
standing, ripeness, finality, reviewability, political question, and sover-
eign immunity are the issues most often raised sua sponte by our judges.
In several critical cases, the party who would benefit from invocation of
such doctrines-usually the government-not only has failed to raise
them, but has expressly declined to do so.59
56 See, e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Bork, J., dissenting)(argu-
ing against congressional standing), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct.
734 (1987).
57 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 470 U. S. 821 (1985).
" Sometimes a court will consider and decide an issue raised not by the parties but by
an amicus curiae or intervenor. See, e.g., Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 92 (D.C. Cir.
1985)(Starr, J., concurring)(pointing out that the parties had pursued the case on an
irrelevant statutory issue and "it was only with the arrival of a very helpful amicus brief
[from the ACLU] in this court that the light suddenly dawned"); California Ass'n. for the
Physically Handicapped v. FCC, 778 F.2d 823, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Wald, J., dis-
senting)(intervenor raised standing issue on which appeal was decided).
" On several occasions our court has emphasized that it is not bound by a party's
decision not to raise an argument. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1510 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc)(Bork, J., dissenting)(on appeal counsel for the District abandoned
a statutory argument raised below: "I do not believe that I am bound by those representa-
tions. Counsel were not abandoning a claim but rather a legal justification for a claim."),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073 (1985).
In Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 791
F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the government had not claimed that the Veteran's Act, 38 U.S.C.
§ 211 (1982) precluded review of the issue decided below, i.e., whether certain action
constituted a rule so as to require notice and comment. On appeal, however, the panel
majority consisting of Judges Bork and Scalia decided that it did: "The only issue we find it
necessary to resolve is whether the statutory preclusion of review of Veteran's Act
decisions ... applies to this case." Id. 756 F.2d at 902. 1 dissented citing the government's
testimony in Congress indicating that it did not interpret its enabling Act to preclude
review of rules. My dissent labelled the rationale "rank judicial interference with a
reasonable statutory interpretation agreed upon by both political branches of government."
Id. at 929 (Wald, J., dissenting). The case was en banced. Before argument, however, the
parties stipulated to a dismissal based on legislation passed by Congress that would provide
for a remedy for the nuclear blast veterans.
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A court is, of course, completely within its authority in raising a
jurisdictional issue on its own. The novelty of some recent cases is,
however, that sua sponte review may be used to change or extend the law
and to enunciate new principles beyond the present confines of circuit
precedent. In the 1984-85 term, we saw at least a dozen such judge-
initiatives, all directed toward cutting off access or review.
60
It only takes a few such cases to convince the parties-especially the
government-that in all close cases it should raise jurisdictional issues to
avoid embarrassment. Never risk waiving them to get to the merits.
In Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the government argued that members of
the Senate and House did have standing to challenge the pocket veto in question. Judge
Bork dissenting, however, remonstrated with the government for its concession. "By
conceding the standing issue appellees endanger a constitutional principle far more
momentous than the scope of the pocket veto power." Id. at 42 n.1 (Bork, J., dissenting),
vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987). It is noteworthy that in
their brief answering the Congressional suit against the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, the
government adopted the Bork theory announced in his Barnes dissent that neither
Congressmen nor even the House or Senate as a body have standing to challenge any injury
to their official power or authority from another branch. Washington Post, Dec. 31, 1985, at
1, col. 3.
Another example of judges raising issues sua sponte is Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1984) where Judge Scalia raised, at oral argument,
the issue of whether the government had validly waived its sovereign immunity so as to be
subject to discovery in a third party suit under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at
398 n.2. The parties were asked to submit supplementary briefs and the case was delayed
until they were considered. Both parties argued that sovereign immunity did not apply and
the case proceeded on its original course. The Circuit court explained:
Since at least 1965 ... this court has assumed the nonapplicability of sovereign
immunity to such a subpoena [citations omitted]. [Sovereign immunity] is a
doctrine 'rooted in history' . . . whose application depends much more upon
tradition than logical analysis ... [and there is] no cause in the present case to
upset a steady course of precedent by attempting to graft onto discovery law a
broad doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Id.
60 See, e.g., American Fed. Gov't Employees v. O'Connor, 747 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir.
1984)(Ginsburg, J.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 279 (1985). But see id. at 758-59 (Mikva, J.,
dissenting) ("employees throughout the nation will effectively be barred from participation
in neutrally conducted voter registration drives sponsored by AFGE or NTEU .... [rights
which may be exercised only by risking unemployment . . . are hollow things indeed");
American Trucking Ass'n., Inc. v. ICC, 747 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(court raised and
relied upon ripeness grounds, explaining that "our own ability to decide intelligently and
our own confidence that we are expending our resources in resolving a dispute that has
substance, are proximately affected.")
In Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the court sua
sponte raised supplementary briefing on the issue of whether the Maryland People's
Counsel could represent consumers in challenging a FERC order. A decision by Judge
Scalia ultimately decided that since the Supreme Court had not yet read federalism
concerns into "core" standing requirements and since the citizens interests were "concrete"
enough there was standing. Although many court decisions in the past had recognized the
standing of such state consumer agencies, Judge Scalia explained there had been "no case
allowing state standing with specific discussion of the issue ... "Id. at 322.
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These access issues gain prominence in the court's jurisprudence, and
judges' jurisprudential agendas are advanced.
But where the court resorts too casually to sua sponte review, there
may be troubling side effects. The risk of court intervention may distort
the appellant's litigation tactics and pressure the government into
raising close questions it wants to avoid. And the court may find itself
deciding questions without the benefit of briefing from the parties-not
infrequently involving standing and ripeness doctrines dependent on
facts or procedures outside the court's knowledge. Indeed, on occasion, our
court, after much post-sua sponte agonizing, has finally decided there is
jurisdiction, as probably the agency, in determining not to raise the
question, had already decided. None of this is by way of suggesting that
Article III courts, bound by the case or controversy limitation, should
ignore jurisdictional doubts, even if the parties have not raised them.6 1 It
does, however, suggest that revisionist judges should exercise restraint in
deciding whether to advance their agendas by this technique. Nonethe-
less, juridical protectionism is definitely on the march. Raising and
deciding issues sua sponte has become a favored technique for restricting
access to our court.
This may reflect an important confluence of philosophy and pragma-
tism. We recently encountered a dramatic upswing in cases filed in our
circuit.6 2 To be candid, we were amassing a frightening backlog. Our
judges expanded their sittings but everyone felt the pressure. In such a
climate, increased resort to front-end dismissals is inevitable. 63 Oppres-
" Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(Bork, J., concur-
ring)("All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III-not only standing but mootness,
ripeness, political question, and the like-relate in part... to an idea which is more than
an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and
prudential limits to the power of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of
government."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 91 (1984).
62 The number of new appeals filed in the circuit skyrocketed from one thousand three
hundred and thirty-seven during fiscal year 1984 to two thousand one hundred and fourteen
in fiscal year 1985, for an amazing increase of fifty-eight percent. COURT STATISTICS, supra
note 5, at 2.
63 Other doctrines involving access to a full-scale trial seem currently to be in flux. For
example, the Supreme Court recently reviewed two cases from our circuit involving the
standards for summary judgment. In one, the Court held that summary judgment may be
granted to a defendant who offers no proof at all to rebut the plaintiffs allegations on a
material issue on which the plaintiff has the ultimate burden at trial, i.e., exposure to the
defendant's asbestos product. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986), rev'g Catrett
v. Johns-Manville, 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Judge Bork had dissented from the
majority opinion on the ground that summary judgment in the absence of any support by
the movant "undermines the traditional authority of trial judges to grant summary
judgment in meritless cases" where the plaintiff has no admissible evidence on an essential
element of his case. 756 F.2d at 187 (Bork, J., dissenting). In the second case, the Supreme
Court reversed a unanimous decision written by Judge Scalia which held that the "clear and
convincing" evidence of malice requirement in a public figure libel case applies to the
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sive caseloads make judges less tolerant of counsels' lapses, less prone to
overlook technical waivers, less likely to search for the substantive
needle in a haphazardly built haystack. 64 If hard cases make bad law, too
many cases may produce, if not bad decisionmaking, at least irritated
judging. I have perceived an escalating impatience on the part of our
judges with substantively weak or repetitive motions and marginal
appeals. 65 There is a growing inclination too to take a hard line on
standing, ripeness, res judicata, issue preclusion and even political
questions.66
ultimate burden of persuasion-not to the standard for summary judgment. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986), rev'g 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
64 The D.C. Circuit, like other circuits, has "enjoyed" the favors of the perennial pro se
litigants. Recently, it has begun to crack down on frivolous or repetitive pro se motions by
requiring a leave to file. See Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Urban filed twenty-eight appeals in the first three months of 1985 which all shared
"common attributes: irrationality, incoherence and a complete lack of any substantive
allegations over which the court might maintain jurisdiction." Citing his residency in the
milkyway galaxy as the grounds for jurisdiction, Mr. Urban sought, inter alia, an
emergency stay of President Reagan's second inauguration. Id. at 1499.
65 The circuit has also begun to impose sanctions on appellants bringing frivolous
appeals. See, e.g., American Security Vanlines, Inc. v. Gallagher, 782 F.2d 1056, 1056-57
(D.C. Cir. 1986):
We affirm and, on our own motion direct appellant and attorney for appellant
to pay the costs and counsel fees reasonably incurred by appellees.... [Appellant]
offers no tenable argument for disturbing the careful adjudication of this case by
the district court. In the main, he repeats implausible, far fetched, or tardily-
raised objections answered with thoroughgoing clarity in the district court's
memorandum.
At the other end of the spectrum, a panel recently issued a strong warning to industry
appellants who raise casual stay motions asserting "irreparable harm" solely on
"unsubstantiated and speculative allegations of recoverable economic injury." Wisconsin
Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1985)("The filing of these motions ... has
been an abuse of the judicial process and has wasted the time and resources of the court.")
But see Sills v. Bureau of Prisons, 761 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(reversing district court's
summary dismissal of prisoners' claim to access to military law materials for his suit.)
66 Located in Washington, the circuit has more than its share of "hot" issues. Last year,
many suits to enjoin government officials' alleged violations of domestic and international
law were dismissed as "political questions", or on other grounds of nonjusticiability. See,
e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(aid to Contras in
Nicaragua); Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(suit to declare invasion of
Grenada a violation of Congress' constitutional power to declare war held moot); Flynt v.
Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(challenge to White House decision to limit press
coverage of Grenada invasion held moot). But see American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge,
768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(no dismissal despite a dissenting view that the Secretary's
decision whether to certify another country as in violation of whaling treaty is a political
question), rev'd sub nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860
(1986).
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5. The Unpublished Opinion
Perhaps the most frustrating way courts deal with unpopular prece-
dent is by evading the precedent in a judgment without opinion or in an
unpublished memorandum. Since such a judgement or memorandum is
not precedent 6v and cannot be cited to the court in future cases, judges
may be tempted to use either tactic to arrive at what they think is the
right result without openly confronting or explaining away hostile
precedent or creating an intracircuit conflict. 68 Our Advisory Committee,
composed of lawyers who practice in the court, recently conducted a
survey of our unpublished opinions over a six month period in 1983 and
concluded that 40 percent of the decisions arguably should have been
published under the court's governing criteria. 69 As caseloads rise,
overburdened courts have an understandable tendency to dispose of more
cases via this covert route.70 Because they are rarely en banced or
67 D.C. Cm. R. APP. P. 8(f) states: "Unpublished orders, including explanatory memo-
randa of this Court, are not to be cited in briefs or memoranda of counsel as precedents.
However, counsel may refer to such orders and memoranda for such purposes as application
of the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case, which turn on the
binding effect of the judgment and not on its quality as precedent."
" A number of commentators have raised concerns about disposing of cases by
unpublished opinion, primarily focusing on the "pernicious effect" of the practice on judicial
responsibility. See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the
United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (1981); see also
R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 122-23 (1985)(summarizing arguments
for publication of all opinions).
Specifically, it is argued that unpublished opinions result in less carefully prepared or
soundly reasoned opinions; reduce judicial accountability; increase the risk of nonuniform-
ity; allow difficult issues to be swept under the carpet; and result in a body of "secret law"
practically inaccessible to many lawyers. Furthermore, there is no uniformly enforced
practice or guidelines for making the publication decision, hence judges exercise consider-
able discretion in deciding when an opinion should be published, i.e., when an opinion will
become law. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy or Collegiality
Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REv. 766, 781-84 (1983); Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 214.
6 See REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
PROCEDURES TO THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 7 (1984).
The revised plan adopted in 1973 states that an opinion will be published if one
of the following criteria is satisfied:
a. it establishes a rule of law on a point of first impression for the court, or alters
or modifies a rule of law previously announced;
b. it involves a legal issue of unusual or continuing public interest;
c. it criticizes existing law;
d. it is considered a significant contribution to legal literature, e.g., through
historical resolution of an apparent conflict in opinions, by furnishing an analysis
of the rationale and policy or content of a rule of law;
e. it applies an established rule of law to a factual situation significantly
different from that in published cases.
Id. (quoting Plan for Publication of Opinions (Apr. 17, 1973)).
'o According to statistics compiled by the Clerk's Office and the Circuit Executive,
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appealed to the Supreme Court 7' (after all, in the words of Carl Sandburg
there is seldom enough for a mouse to fasten a tooth in)72 such decisions
provide an easy device for ignoring precedent or too casually distinguish-
ing it away. The Advisory Subcommittee's report warned that:
the court's unpublished opinion-no citation doctrine renders the
doctrine of stare decisis ineffective as a safeguard against unprin-
cipled judicial decisionmaking. If the need ever arises for the
court to resolve a case in a way that it would prefer to ignore in
issuing future decisions, the no citation rule gives it the power to
do so.73
Newly revised criteria now say that we should publish an opinion
whenever "it alters, modifies, or significantly clarifies a rule of law
previously announced by the court" or "criticizes or questions within the
court . . ,,., But the judges themselves are the only monitors of how
roughly one-third to one-half of this court's decisions each year are disposed of by order of
judgment alone or accompanied by a brief unpublished and uncitable memorandum. In
statistical year 1982 (July 1, 1981 to June 30, 1982), fifty-one percent of this court's six
hundred and twenty-seven decisions were unpublished as compared to thirty-two point
eight percent of this court's five hundred and thirty-three decisions in statistical year 1984.
National Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 172 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(sep-
arate statement of Wald, J.).
71 See generally Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Pub-
lication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv.
1167, 1203 (1978)(discussing reasons why unpublished opinions are less likely to be
reviewed by the Supreme Court).
72 C. SANDBURG, The Lawyers Know Too Much, in SELECTED POEMS OF CARL SANDBURG 199
(R. West ed. 1954).
73 SuBcoMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 69, at 24.
" An opinion, memorandum, or other statement explaining the basis for the Court's
action in issuing an order or judgment shall be published if it meets one or more of the
following criteria:
1. with regard to a substantial issue it resolves, it is a case of first impression
or the first case to present the issue in this Circuit;
2. it alters, modifies, or significantly clarifies a rule of law previously an-
nounced by the Court;
3. it calls attention to an existing rule of law that appears to have been
generally overlooked;
4. it criticizes or questions existing law;
5. it resolves an apparent conflict in decisions within the Circuit or creates a
conflict with another Circuit;
6. it reverses an agency or district court decision, or affirms a decision of the
district court upon grounds different from those set forth in the district court's
published opinion; or
7. it warrants publication in light of other factors that give it general public
interest.
113 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 539, 541-2 (March 19, 1985)(quoting proposed D.C. Cm. R. APP. P.
13(b)).
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faithfully those criteria are applied.7 5 Although the report admitted that
"we did not find a single unpublished opinion that on its face criticized
existing law or resolved conflicts in opinions,"76 the potential of conflict
between published and unpublished opinions is plainly there. In fact, the
D.C. Circuit's use of these dispositions is low compared to other circuits-
under 50%-but with the pressure of rising caseloads, we can expect that
rate to rise. Withal, they cannot change circuit law and so are unlikely to
become a major vehicle for aggressive law reformers.
B. Resisting Change
The push for change does not go unchallenged. At all times, there are
judges on the court who resist. These days, the resisters are probably
slipping into the minority. When that happens, the ideological tilt of the
court's majority makes itself felt throughout the process. The spectre of
being reversed en banc overhangs the judges' position on the panel
decision. Even when the random selection from among 12 active and
several senior or visiting judges produces a panel of two or even three
defiant judges, the panel's rationale, sometimes even its result, emerges
in the shadow of an en banc. Often this means judicial "punting" if you
will. The panel will avoid constitutional issues or decide a controversial
case on the narrowest factual ground, remand on a procedural ground so
as to avoid outright endorsement or rejection of a substantive legal
doctrine with which it is uncomfortable.7 7 Judges will generally resist
" See, National Classification Comm. v. ICC, 765 F.2d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(separate
statement of Wald, J. criticizing the use of an unpublished opinion to decide a novel
question of statutory interpretation which, although not precedent, was resjudicata for an
organizational litigant); "[it is imperative that we scrutinize our selection of those cases to
be disposed of without reasons and without precedential effect ever more carefully so as to
avoid confusion, repetition, nonuniformity, and even skepticism about the way we do our
job." Id. at 175.
76 Subcommittee Report, supra note 69, at 44-45. For a recent publication summing up
all of the circuits' practices on use of unpublished decisions, see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS: PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND USE IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS (FJC Staff
Paper 1985).
" See e.g., Karriem v, Barry, 743 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(remand for factual inquiries
necessary before deciding a constitutional question whether a minister must sign a
government "volunteer" agreement before being allowed to perform religious services for
prison inmates); Hastings v. Judicial Conference, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985)("principle
of constitutional avoidance" invoked to postpone deciding separation powers and due
process challenge to ongoing disciplinary proceedings against federal judge), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Hess, 745 F.2d 697 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)("attenuation of controversy" doctrine called for exercise of discretion of judicial
authority to forego a decision on individuals' constitutional claims that their religious
beliefs prohibited their rising when a judge enters courtroom); cf. McCalpin v. Durant, 766
F.2d 535, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1985)("With the political branches engaged in these thrusts and
parries, we did not rush to judgment.")(In McCalpin judgment on a challenge to a series of
[Vol. 34:477
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announcing any broad new principle unless there is a chance that it may
be hospitably received in the Supreme Court. Where a circuit majority is
clearly in sync with the Supreme Court majority, a dissent may be only
a quixotic exercise. Obvious as this fact of judicial life is, I often hear
older Washington lawyers lamenting the dearth nowadays of ringing
declarations of liberal principle, the great leaps across judicial frontiers
that characterized the D.C. Circuit in the late sixties and early
seventies. They forget that those decisions were made within the safe
harbor of a sympathetic Supreme Court. The hard truth is that many of
those once-dramatic precedents totter within our circuit today.
But the question may well be asked-how valid is it for a judge to
factor in the risk of an en banc when she decides how to rule in a case or
even how to frame the issues on which to rule? I know judges who insist
that they are impervious to such concerns, ruling and writing exactly as
they believe, damn the consequences. Perhaps, because I believe ours is
not a heroic era, I remain a bit skeptical. Certainly some judges weigh
the practical considerations more lightly than others. But, any judge
writing a panel opinion has to capture a second-desirably a third-vote
for any opinion he writes. And in cases where there is a dissent, an
enormous amount of time may be consumed as draft panel opinions and
dissents shuttle back and forth among the panelists. Often this exchange
results in a more temperate position than taken in the majority's first
draft. The search for consensus is a vital part of the dynamics of any
decisionmaking body. Since a panel of a circuit court is exercising the
delegated power of the entire court, subject to ultimate review by the
entire court, it is proper in my view, and certainly strategically wise, for
a panel to take account of what the full court assembled might decide en
banc and to cast its decision in a way that it believes would survive that
review.
The judge's calculus gets more complicated, however, when she writes
not just to anticipate and survive an en banc but to stave off an en banc
on a critical issue, to temporize in the hope that as members of the court
change in the future, her side may ultimately triumph. Most judges, of
course, are not strangers to the rough in-fighting of private practice,
government, or legislatures; they have manuevered in and out of
countless tight spots. But are these tactics appropriate on an appellate
court?
The answer is not "Yes or No", but "More or Less". So long as there
are alternative rationales that can dispose of the case in a principled
way, why may a judge not choose the "passive virtue" of postponing a
major substantive law decision? Often a worthy appellant will proffer a
recent appointments to the Legal Services Corporation Board of Directors was postponed for
several years until mooted by permanent appointments confirmed by the Senate).
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number of grounds for reversal, just as a worthy appellee will offer
multiple grounds for affirmance. The agency decision on appeal may be
challenged as unconstitutional, beyond statutory authority, lacking
evidence in the record or just plain arbitrary and capricious. It may
be defended on grounds that the appeal was not timely, or that the
decision was reasonable, authorized, and constitutional. If the court feels
reversal is warranted, a determination that the agency action was
arbitrary and capricious, if available, is usually the least threatening to
the agency, since on remand it can do whatever it wants if it makes a
proper record and explains itself sufficiently. 78 If the court finds that the
agency has not even met the Administrative Procedure Act require-
ments of a reasoned analysis, it need not rule on constitutional or even
statutory grounds. An agency is not so likely to appeal such a decision-
whereas a judicial limitation on its statutory power or the constitution-
ality of its actions is generally regarded more seriously since it takes
congressional action to remedy. 79
There may, however, be times when the uncertainty and genuine
public injury that a non-decision on an important legal issue produces,
makes it morally wrong to dodge. Refusing to decide a critical issue on the
merits can at times produce a political logjam; the executive and
legislative branches will not or cannot move to resolve the underlying
dispute until the court does.8 0 Then, too, one judge does not the judiciary
" See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 S. Ct. 837
(1984)(mandating considerable deference to administrative agency's constructions of stat-
utes). Since Chevron, the courts seem to have focused less on the ultimate reasonableness of
the agency's action, and more on whether the agency has satisfied its duty to explain its
reasoning. See, e.g., Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 150-56 (D.C. Cir.
1984)(Chevron affords an agency-wide latitude in the "reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies which are central to agency's care by the statute," agency's failure to
provide any analysis of its financial justification, however, for requiring phase-in of
mandatory pre-retirement vesting of pension benefits under ERISA proved fatal). See also
Delmarva Power & Light v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1131, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(FERC's
requirements for selective annualization constitute an unexplained departure from control-
ling precedent: "We find it impossible to discern in the pronouncements of the Commission
itself... a test for determining when selective annualization will be allowed"); Maryland
Peoples Council v. FERC, 761 F.2d 768, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(an experiment must be
"reasonable," including the articulation of a reason to believe more good than harm will
come of it).
79 See supra note 50.
" Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1985), is in this category. Until the court
ruled whether or not the federal government could close a shelter for the homeless run by
the plaintiffs' organization, or whether the federal government must provide money for its
renovation, the District of Columbia Government, the plaintiffs, and the federal govern-
ment were uncertain in which direction to move. After we ruled that the shelter could be
closed, the political branches had no excuse to remain inert, and they subsequently moved
not only to postpone the closing but to make emergency repairs to the disputed shelter. Id.
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make, and even if I manage to evade an important substantive issue, my
colleagues on the next panel, or in another circuit may not be so reticent.
Although conscious choices to avoid confrontations are often legiti-
mate, the process may make bad law. In a court where jurisdiction is
mandatory there is a limit to how long or how often a judge may fairly
resist changing trends in the law that have the support of a majority of
her court and of the Supreme Court. Yet even then a responsible dissent
may play an important function in moderating an extreme majority
stance, in forcing the majority to confront consequences of their ruling
they may not have contemplated, in exposing vulnerable reasoning, in
pointing out that change in circuit law has actually taken place.
III. THE APPELLATE JUDGE AND THE SUPREME COURT
A. Circuit Court-Supreme Court Relationships
The Supreme Court and circuit courts are symbiotically bonded to one
another. The relationship runs both ways; it is not confined to the
Supreme Court's role in guiding lower federal courts in their interpreta-
tion of the law. The work of the Supreme Court, especially when it is
deciding novel issues or changing course in an important area of the law
draws heavily on the work of perceptive, and even visionary, lower court
judges to frame vital issues, document the need for their resolution or
clarification, and develop rationales to justify one solution or reform over
another.
The Supreme Court most frequently makes new law or reaffirms old
law in the course of reviewing circuit court decisions. The opinions in the
court below by and large set the terms of debate for the Justices, and
structure the arguments for counsel. As Justice Douglas once remarked
of Jerome Frank: "We Supreme Court Justices can only be grateful that
Judge Frank explored a problem ahead of us. For this search usually left
the clues to the answer we seek."'81
Of course, at particular times, certain courts and certain judges appear
to enjoy greater favor than others in the eyes of the Supreme Court, as
reflected in affirmances or, more frequently, denials of certiorari in cases
they write and reversals of cases in which they dissent.8 2 In the
1984-85 term, I must tell you, our circuit was reversed by the Supreme
Court in 100% of the cases that reached the court (10 out of 10). In 7 of
" R. GLENNON, supra note 25, at 174 (quoting Douglas, Jerome N. Frank, 10 J. LEGAL ED.
1, 6 (1957)). The Supreme Court reversed nineteen cases in which Frank dissented from the
circuit court opinion. Id. at 164-92.
2 Glennon recounts the letter from Justice Harlan to Learned Hand: "May I say that
when you read in Monday's New York Times 'Certiorari Denied' to one of your cases, then
despite the usual teachings, what the notation really means is 'Judgement Affirmed."' R.
GLENNON, supra note 25, at 172-73 (citing M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 331 n.72 (1970)).
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those reversals, there was a dissent below. s 3 As a rule, the dissenter
claimed the circuit had not faithfully followed Supreme Court prece-
dent,8 4 but on occasion a confident dissenting judge derides or faults
Supreme Court precedent plainly inviting the Court, on certiorari, to
rethink the validity of that precedent. s5 This is hardly a novel tactic;
eminent circuit judges of the past have said they felt responsible to probe
"pronounced new doctrinal trends" in Supreme Court rulings to ascertain
whether a precedent had been "implicitly" overruled. 86
Judges out of sync with the current Supreme Court, on the other hand,
tend to follow much the same pattern that they do with an inhospitable
majority on their own court: keep their decisions fact-bound, advance no
new or startling principles of law, do their best to bring their decisions
within secure Supreme Court precedent. Since the Supreme Court has a
limited capacity to hear cases, and can take at most a half dozen or so
" See supra note 52. The Supreme Court grants a higher rate of certiorari petitions from
the D.C. Circuit and reverses it more often than any other court. See Note, Disagreement in
D.C.: The Relationship Between the D.C. Circuit and its Implications for a National Court of
Appeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048, 1049-50 (1984)(from 1980-83 the Court granted certiorari
in eighteen point seven percent of petitions from the D.C. Circuit as compared to a national
average of six point six percent. During that same period, the Court affirmed the D.C.
Circuit only ten point four percent of the time, as compared with a national average of
thirty-nine point two percent). Notwithstanding the greater percentage of petitions for
certiorari granted to cases from the D.C. Circuit, there is "no evidence that the D.C. Circuit
does not apply relevant Supreme Court precedent in good faith, but the D.C. Circuit's
answers to questions that remain genuinely controversial under those precedents, are likely
to be guided in part by ideological views that differ significantly from those of the Supreme
Court." Id. at 1060.
84 See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans v. CAB, 752 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(JJ. Bork, Scalia,
and Starr, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)(charging that the panel
opinion conflicts with Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), and North Haven v.
Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982), in that it ignores the "program specific" scope of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), and adopts an "institution-wide approach
which the Court rejected), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2705 (1986). (The original panel acknowledged
that Grove City applied 504 to "any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance," but held that airline's activity encompasses necessary use of airports and
possibly controllers).
s1 My colleagues take differing views on the propriety of this course of action. Cf.
Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1581 n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Statement of Ginsburg, J.)("In
my view, lower court judges are not obliged to cede to the law reviews exclusive
responsibility for indicating a need for, and proposing the direction of 'Further enlighten-
ment for Higher Authority" (quoting United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 881 (2d Cir.
1981)(Oakes, J., concurring)) with Dronenburg, Id. at 1584 (Statement of Starr, J.)("It is not
the province of the lower federal courts to chide the Supreme Court for decisions that, in the
considered view of federal judges, may be ill-reasoned or misguided").
" See R. GLENNON, supra note 25, at 177. But see FAIC Sec., Inc. v. Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, 768 F.2d 352, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Scalia, J.)("It may be that recent dictum
foreshadows a change in what seems to have been the prior law-or a clarification ...
however, the change or clarification has not yet arrived, and we feel constrained to follow
the holdings [of earlier cases]")
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cases a year from the 300 or so issued by the circuit,8 7 they can hope by
these strategies to enjoy benign neglect from on high.
B. Interpretation of Supreme Court Precedent
Circuit courts frequently enlighten the meaning of Supreme Court
precedent, decide whether precedent should be applied in a particular
case, and extend or limit precedent in new situations. The way in which
circuit judges apply Supreme Court precedent shapes the course of circuit
law itself.s8 One recent, much-publicized case in our court8 9 shows how
erratically judges defer to Supreme Court precedents. Because the case
involved a highly charged social and moral issue, it offers a striking
illustration of judges' philosophies at work 90
1. Dronenburg v. Zech: Overreaching or Underreaching Precedent
In August of 1984, a three-judge panel of our court issued an instantly
controversial decision, in Dronenburg v. Zech,9' upholding the Navy's
administrative discharge of a 27-year-old petty officer for consensual
homosexual conduct on a Navy base. The Navy regulation at issue
declared that any member who engaged in homosexual acts shall
"normally" be discharged, because "[t]he presence of such a member in a
military environment seriously impairs combat readiness, efficiency,
security, and morale." No comparable sanction was attached to hetero-
7 Of course, the proposed intercircuit tribunal would add measurably to the risk of
reversal. See Intercircuit Panel of the United States Act: Hearings on S.704 Before the
Subcommittee on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 9,
1985)(testimony of Judges Wald, Edwards & Ginsburg).
8s See, e.g., White House Vigil v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Wald, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)(expressing "disagreement with the insistent
theme in the majority opinion implying that the Supreme Court's recent decisions have
changed the character or the mood of appropriate judicial scrutiny for time, place and
manner restrictions").
89 The case has given rise to considerable popular comment and scholarly analysis. See,
e.g., Saphire, Gay Rights and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Theory, Practice
and Dronenburg v. Zech, 10 DAYTON L. REV. 767 (1985); Note, The Constitutional Status of
Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HAuv. L. REV. 1285 (1985).
0 The broader issue of the role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy is, of
course, the subject of much academic debate. See, e.g., J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Bennett, Judicial Activism and the
Concept of Original Intent, 69 JUDICATURE 219 (Jan. 1986); Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking
the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEx.
L. REV. 1207 (1984); Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1
(1983-1984); Saphire, Constitutional Theory in Perspective: A Response to Professor Van
Alstyne, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1435 (1984); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
ofInterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HAsv. L. REv. 781 (1983); Note, Constitutional
Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1981).
91 741 F.2d 1388, reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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sexual conduct, which in general was to be considered on a case-by-case
basis as a possible ground for disciplinary measures.9 2
Dronenburg claimed that the Navy's regulation violated his constitu-
tional rights to privacy and to equal protection of the laws. Judge Bork,
writing for the panel, first noted that in 1976 the Supreme Court, in Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney,93 summarily affirmed a district court judg-
ment upholding a state criminal statute forbidding homosexual con-
duct. 94 Strongly suggesting that it was bound by that precedent, the
panel nevertheless went on to consider Dronenburg's claim on the merits.
After reviewing a succession of Supreme Court cases in which the Court
had upheld a constitutional right to privacy for marriage, contraception,
and abortion, the panel decided that there was no comparable constitu-
tional right to engage in homosexual conduct. 95
The panel's technique in Dronenburg was straightforward: it stated the
results of the privacy cases, announced that the opinions offered no
general principle to account for those results, and refused to apply the
cases beyond their facts. The panel stated that some interpretations of the
earlier privacy cases might encompass a right to private, consensual
homosexual conduct and some might not. In the end, it simply declared
that lower federal courts should leave to the Supreme Court the task of
inferring "new" constitutional rights by analogy to the decided cases. By
a 6-5 vote the full court denied rehearing en banc. The dissenting judges,
of which I was one, argued, that the constitutional right of privacy was
firmly established in the Supreme Court's cases, and that the panel had
not made a conscientious effort to interpret and apply that right,
whatever the result. Instead of trying to give the right of privacy a
coherent shape, the dissenters stated, the panel had given it the narrow-
9 2 741 F.2d at 1389 n.1 (quoting SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C promulgated Jan. 20,
1978). Relevant Navy regulations permitted retention of a member who had engaged in
homosexual conduct if, among other conditions, the member engaged in such conduct on a
single occasion and did not profess or demonstrate a proclivity to repeat the conduct. The
Secretary of the Navy also "retained the power to keep a person in service despite
homosexual conduct on an ad hoc basis for reasons of military necessity." Id.
93 425 U.S. 901 (1976)(mem. op.), affg 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
" Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391-92.
95 Id. at 1391-97. Some might say that the holding was considerably more expansive than
the case required. The Supreme Court has held that regulations governing members of the
military may sometimes make distinctions on grounds that would be unconstitutional if
applied to civilians. E.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Thus, all the panel needed
to decide was whether the military could discharge a member for homosexual conduct, not
whether any person has under any circumstances a constitutionally protected right to
engage in homosexual conduct. It was this allegedly unnecessary breadth that prompted the
judges dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc to comment that the panel opinion
demonstrated a lack of judicial restraint.
The responsibility of an appellate court to guide lower courts is often in tension with its
duty to decide constitutional cases on the narrowest possible ground.
[Vol. 34:477
32https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss4/3
USE OF PRECEDENT
est possible scope, making the Supreme Court's decisions appear as
disconnected fragments rather than a consistently evolving doctrine.96
Nine months later, in Hardwick v. Bowers,9 7 a panel of the Eleventh
Circuit was confronted with a constitutional attack on a Georgia statute
making private consensual homosexual conduct between adults a crime.
Examining the same line of cases discussed in Dronenburg, the Hardwick
circuit panel found that the right to engage in private homosexual
conduct was not distinguishable in principle from the right to sexual
autonomy in intimate heterosexual relationships, including those outside
marriage, which the Supreme Court had held protected in privacy
decisions. 98 Although the Hardwick holding was subsequently reversed
by the Supreme Court holding the Georgia statute to be constitutional,
the strong dissenting opinions, echoed the circuit panel's reasoning based
on the Court's prior privacy decisions.
In literal terms, the Dronenburg and Hardwick circuit panels dealt
with different issues: the Dronenburg panel decided whether the Navy
could discharge an officer for homosexual acts committed by a naval
officer in barracks, while the Hardwick panel decided whether a state
may make homosexual acts voluntarily committed by adults in the home
a crime. But the circuits reached plainly irreconcilable answers to the
question whether homosexual conduct is ever constitutionally protected,
and in that fundamental sense they did conflict. On the surface, the two
circuit courts simply disagreed on the effect to be given the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth and on whether
there was a consistent theme running through the Supreme Court's
privacy cases. 99 On reflection, however the disagreements unfold into a
" Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Robinson, C.J., and JJ.
Wald, Mikva, and Edwards, dissenting from denial of suggestion to rehear case en banc).
97 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
9s Id. at 1208-12.
Paradoxical as it may seem, our prior cases thus establish that a State may not
prohibit sodomy within 'the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms,' Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), or, indeed, betweeen unmarried heterosex-
ual adults. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). In all events, it is
perfectly clear that the State of Georgia may not totally prohibit the conduct
proscribed by statute.
106 S. Ct. at 2845 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion disagreed and held that the Constitution does not confer a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy, rebutting the claim that any
kind of sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state
proscription. Id. at 2842-45.
" The Supreme Court specifically noted that the Eleventh Circuit's holding in this case
was contrary to judgments rendered in other court of appeals. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, reh'g denied, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985)(en
banc)(holding that the summary affirmance in Doe is binding on the court and that a statute
prohibiting deviate sexual intercourse does not offend the Constitution); Dronenburg, 741
F.2d 1338, reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (1986).
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wider conflict over the relationship between the lower courts and the
Supreme Court in the development of constitutional law.
Dronenburg and Hardwick show how very differently circuit judges
interpret Supreme Court privacy decisions. The Dronenburg panel held
that there was no conclusive constitutional right to be let alone from
government regulation: courts need a much more discriminating princi-
ple and the Supreme Court has only touched upon, but never explicitly
outlined, the contours of that principle.
The Hardwick panel, in contrast, was able to perceive the contours in
a line of decisions from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade:100 The
100 Dronenburg and Hardwick both showed understandable bemusement over the
meaning of Doe. Each panel dutifully acknowledged that summary affirmances by the
Supreme Court are binding on the lower courts. But the Supreme Court's own instructions
on this point are a model of careful ambiguity:
As Mr. Justice Brennan once observed, [v]otes to affirm summarily, and to dismiss
for want of a substantial federal question, it hardly needs comment, are votes on
the merits of a case .... The District Court should have followed the Second
Circuit's advise, . . .that unless and until the Supreme Court should instruct
otherwise, inferior federal courts had best adhere to the view that if the Court has
branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so except when doctrinal
developments indicate otherwise; and, later.. . that the lower courts are bound by
summary decisions by this Court 'until such time as the court informs [them] that
[they] are not.'
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975)(citations omitted).
Justice Brennan later commented that before Hicks, members of the Court "assumed that
summary dispositions without opinion did not have the same precedential force as decisions
rendered with opinion after plenary consideration-indeed it was properly perceived that
behind our summary dispositions of appeals lie many of the same considerations that
account for denials of certiorari." Sidle v. Majors, 429 U.S. 945, 946 (1976)(Brennan, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari). See also Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v.
Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 913 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The care
with which the Court considers decisions to affirm or, in cases coming from state courts, to
dismiss for want of a substantial federal question, may have changed in the wake of Hicks.
Nonetheless, reflections like these, coupled with the fact that the Court takes summary
action without oral argument or full briefing, leads to understandable skepticism about the
depth in which the Court goes into such cases.
Two further caveats are relevant to Doe. First, summary dispositions are binding "only to
'the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions."' Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 499 (1981)(quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176
(1977)(per curiam)), and they do not necessarily adopt the reasoning of the lower court.
Second, "[siummary actions.., should not be understood as breaking new ground but as
applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts involved." Mandel
v. Bradley, 432 U.S. at 176.
Doe teeters precariously on the edge of all these rules. First, the plaintiffs in Doe
apparently did not show any real likelihood that the challenged statute might be enforced
against them. There is, therefore, a very substantial argument that they lacked standing to
bring suit. The Dronenburg panel commented that "those plaintiffs may have lacked
standing, but the majority of the three-judge district court placed its decision squarely on
the constitutionality of the statute, and the Supreme Court's summary affirmance gives no
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state may not prohibit access to contraceptives or even abortions out-
right, and may regulate abortions only in accordance with substantial
indication that the Court proceeded upon any other rationale." Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at
1392.
In light of the Supreme Court's repeated insistence that summary affirmances "'affirm
the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached,"' Mandel, 432 U.S.
at 176 (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975)(Burger, C.J., concur-
ring)(footnote omitted); cf. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Bork, J.,
dissenting)("no basis for using an unexplained case as the reason for creating a general rule
of standing for all branches and members of branches to assert their legal rights directly
against one another"), Dronenburg's guess that the Supreme Court did not consider the
standing question is not an altogether satisfying basis for decision.
Aside from serious questions concerning the Doe summary affirmance, there is also the
Court's admonitions that summary affirmances bind lower courts only until the Court
informs them that they do not or until doctrinal developments indicate otherwise. In Carey
v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Supreme Court pointedly observed that
"the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what extent
the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior
among adults." Id. at 688 n.5 (quoting Carey, 431 U.S. at 694, n.17 (brackets in original).
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist could not 'let pass without comment" the majority's
observation. Citing Doe, he argued that "the facial constitutional validity of criminal
statutes prohibiting certain consensual acts has been 'definitely' established." Id. at 718,
n.2. Curiously, the Court in Dronenburg, seemed to rely exclusively on Justice Rehnquist's
dissent as opposed to the majority's suggestion in Carey.
In short, a fair-minded survey of the arguments for and against the binding force of Doe
led to no clear result. In light of the Carey footnote, Doe could reasonably be held not to
control. But that is not the purpose in explicating this litany of cases. Analysis of this
ongoing scenario serves to demonstrate how seemingly technical questions about the
binding effect of a summary affirmance dissolve under scrutiny into difficult yet unavoid-
able problems of substance. At every turn, lower court judges must use their own judgment
to determine when a technical or procedural escape hatch is valid by attempting to discern,
from complex interfaces, the propriety of using ambiguous summary affirmances to decide,
or perhaps evade, difficult questions of constitutional law.
I do not suggest that judges manipulate cases by expanding the reasoning in some, while
contracting the reasoning in others-all in an effort to get to the result they were
determined to reach anyway. Rather, the solving of difficult cases often requires that a
judge reconcile or balance legal principles in apparent conflict. For example, if a judge
thought that Roe v. Wade, "properly read," expounded a broad right to sexual autonomy,
and that Carey and subsequent cases confirmed that right, the judge would be inclined to
interpret Doe consistently with that thesis-either as grounded on standing or as implicitly
overruled by Carey. Such a decision would not be attributable soley to personal preference
or result-orientation. Instead, it would emanate from the judge's obligation to view the law
as a coherent whole, to the extent possible. If, on the other hand, a judge thought that the
foundations of Roe v. Wade reflect a tradition of respect for marriage and personal decisions
about childbearing, then that judge would doubtlessly be more willing to seeDoe as a decision
on the merits.
In this manner, the perceived binding effect of Doe on lower court judges depended, in
part, on whether they believed Doe was decided correctly to begin with. In one sense, that
realization is troubling: whether Doe was binding should have been the threshold question
before a lower court judge considering the merits, yet the answer to the threshold question
turned out to involve the merits. In another sense, however, this close relationship between
form and substance is reassuring. If our jurisprudence is one of principle, then judges owed
litigants an articulated explanation of the principles expounded in the Supreme Court's
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constitutional restrictions. The state may not prohibit persons of different
races from marrying one another, and may not criminalize an adult's
private possession, in the home, of sexually explicit material, including
material that if publicly sold could constitutionally be banned as obscene.
Thus, the Circuit panel reasoned, the protected status of private consen-
sual adult homosexual conduct sequentially followed. The Supreme
Court, however, ultimately rejected the panel's analogies, stating: "None
of the rights in those [prior] cases bears any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is
asserted in this case."''1
Dronenburg, perhaps more than any other case in the circuit so far,
unveiled fundamental ideological differences about the role of judges in
interpreting Supreme Court precedent in the context of conflicts between
individual autonomy and community morality. By limiting the extension
of past precedent which a majority panel dislikes and which it feels (in
this case, correctly) a current Supreme Court might also refuse to extend,
judges can mightily change the tone of circuit hospitality to constitu-
tional rights arguments. The word travels quickly and where choice is
possible, plaintiffs will try their luck elsewhere.
When a Supreme Court precedent squarely decides an issue presented
to a lower court, that court has no principled choice other than to follow
the Supreme Court's lead. Inevitably, when lower court judges consider
the precedential force of a relevant but not obviously controlling case,
including a case in the Supreme Court, they think about whether the case
was right on the merits. By this I do not mean that judges manipulate the
cases, expanding the reasoning in some and contracting the reasoning in
others, all in an effort to get to the result they were determined to reach
anyway. I mean that solving hard cases often requires a judge to reconcile
or balance legal principles in apparent conflict, and he cannot escape the
infusion into such decisions of his most basic notions of jurisprudence,
fairness and justice.
2. Chaney v. Heckler: Embracing New Precedent
In contrast to the reluctance of the Dronenburg panel, the eagerness
with which some panels of the court may embrace and extend a welcome
privacy decisions and why until the Supreme Court decided the issue in Hardwick, those
principles either did or did not prohibit laws indiscriminately prohibiting all homosexual
conduct. The Supreme Court in Doe refused to provide such an explanation. The
Dronenburg panel held, in the alternative, that it need not provide any explanation because
Doe was binding and that it could not give any explanation because the Supreme Court's
decisions were incoherent. Neither of these approaches was altogether satisfactory without
a more serious effort to understand the principles underlying the privacy cases.
11 Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
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precedent is illustrated by the follow-up of Heckler v. Chaney,,0 2 a divided
decision in our court, subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court,
largely on the basis of Judge Scalia's dissent. In Chaney, prison inmates
sentenced to be executed by lethal drug injection asked the Court to order
the Food and Drug Administration to ban the states' use of the drugs. The
FDA Commissioner had refused to take the requested action, deeming it
not the best use of his discretionary enforcement authority. Our court
held that the FDA erred. On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that FDA's refusal was unreviewable under the Administrative
Procedure Act. Given the myriad of factors that go into an agency's deci-
sion whether to initiate enforcement action, so analogous to traditional
prosecutorial discretion, the Court held that the APA provision preclud-
ing review of "agency action committed to agency discretion by law"
applied.
Since Chaney came down on March 20, 1984, it has been argued by the
government as a precedent for nonreviewability in a wide variety of
situations ranging from refusal to appoint counsel for an ex-government
official sued in her personal capacity, 0 3 to closing a shelter for the
homeless in the District. 0 4 Plainly sympathetic, some panels of the Court
have begun to respond generously; others, less enthusiastic about its
1o2 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
103 Falkowski v. EEOC, 764 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1985), petition for reh'g denied, 783 F.2d
252 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The case was remanded by the Supreme Court which had vacated the
earlier panel opinion, 719 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1983), in light of Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649
(1985). See Department of Justice v. Falkowski, 105 S. Ct. 1860 (1985). The court, on
remand, held that the government's contention that the nonmandatory language of the
regulations that gave it unreviewable discretion were "sufficient to overcome the presump-
tion of reviewability." 764 F.2d at 911. The court explained that the issue of payment of
attorney's fees for government officials was "admittedly less similar to the historically
protected exercise of prosecutorial discretion than ... the decision ... to bring an action to
enforce a statute" Id. Nonetheless, it determined that "Equally important to the Supreme
Court's decision... were the superiority of the agency as a decision maker on the questions
at issue and the absence of any congressional pronouncements cabining the agency's
discretion. Because of the applicability of these two latter grounds to this case, DoJ's action
is unreviewable." Id.
Most recently, the Falkowski panel issued a statement in respect to denial of the petition
for rehearing which emphasized that it was not adopting the Chaney presumption of
nonreviewability: "Here we conclude simply that some of the factors that led the Chaney
Court to establish a presumption of unreviewability for agency enforcement decisions
convince us that any presumption of reviewability of representation decisions has been
rebutted." 783 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
'04 For example, in Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 44-46 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the court
rejected the government's argument for nonreviewability, holding instead that Chaney
created an extremely narrow exception to the general presumption of reviewability.
Furthermore, the government's rescission of its commitment to fund the shelter for the
homeless was not determined to be within the narrow exception.
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implications for judicial review, have set about trying to keep it securely
tied to its prosecutorial origins.
Chaney is a precedent which, on its face, applies only to enforcement
choices. Yet the broad language of the Court about why enforcement
choices should not be reviewed, why deference should be given to agency
expertise and to the agency's decision on how to deploy its limited
resources, apply as well to other kinds of agency policymaking. Judges,
who think the federal courts are reviewing too many decisions, read
Chaney broadly as a signal to move forcefully to cut off review where
Congress' directions to the agency are arguably vague or general.10 5 On
the other hand, those judges more hospitable to judicial review of agency
action register concern that taken too far, Chaney not only will cut off
review of substantive legal issues and policies that inevitably take
resource allocations into consideration, but will also permit agencies to
insulate pure statutory interpretations about what a law means by
dressing them up in the guise of enforcement decisions. 0 6 In our circuit
right now, judges are walking a tightrope between these polar views of
Chaney.0 7
It is, of course, naive to believe that Supreme Court Justices signing on
to a decision have the foresight to anticipate every possible ramification
of the decision or of the decision's language. To an important extent, the
Justices rely on the lower courts to interpret their precedents in a
1o5 See Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F,2d 37, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Bork, J., dissenting)("In
this case, the substantive statute provides no standing to govern appellant's
challenge... [ilf there is law to apply simply because a statute contains criteria that are in
no way relevant to the complaint made, the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is
greatly expanded.").
toe The court recently dealt with this problem in International Union, United Automo-
bile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). The government argued that Chaney barred review of all aspects of its
nonenforcement decision-even those aspects announcing new, substantive interpretations
of the governing statute. The court rejected the government's argument because of the far
reaching effects of the enforcement decisions. Ultimately, the court held that the announced
interpretations were reviewable. In so holding, the court pointed out that "it seems almost
ludicrous to suggest that there is 'no law to apply' in reviewing whether an agency has
reasonably interpreted a law." Id. at 246 (emphasis in original).
'o' In Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1985), for example, a drug
manufacturer and the FDA reached a settlement agreement under which the FDA would
take no action against the manufacturer for a specified period. Although the competitor
filing the suit alleged that the agreement had the effect of de facto approval of the drug, the
court held that the settlement "merely embodies a legitimate exercise of enforcement
discretion," and was thus unreviewable under Chaney. Id. at 686. Recognizing the potential
of this holding for shielding all settlements--no matter how extreme-from judicial review,
the court explained that it was not holding that "any agency settlement with a potential
regulatee, whatever its terms, is unreviewable under Chaney. Id. (emphasis in original).
Yet, the court did not elaborate on factors which would serve as the basis for its formulation
of a distinction.
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reasoned manner.' 08 Thus, in Falkowski v. EEOC, the panel, effectively
though not explicitly, extended Chaney's presumption of nonreview-
ability in enforcement decisions to an agency's decision not to provide
counsel for an official sued in her official capacity. While it recognized
that the two cases were not strictly analogous, it concluded that since
some of the concerns evinced by the Supreme Court in Chaney applied,
Chaney controlled. The Dronenburg panel had taken a long line of cases
and read any conceivable principle out of it. In contrast, the Falkowski
panel took a single precedent and read a broad, expansive principle
into it.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that precedent--even Supreme Court precedent-is what
the courts make of it. Judges often refuse to expand precedent for which
they lack sympathy and enthusiastically enlarge precedent they like. I
would submit, however, that lower court judges have a responsibility in
construing Supreme Court precedent to look behind the holdings of
individual cases and ask "why," to determine whether a discernible,
coherent principle emerges that deserves application to a new fact
situation. But they have a duty, too, not to apply rationales or dicta in
Supreme Court precedent profligately to new situations simply because
the words fit. Certainly lower courts must follow Supreme Court prece-
dent unless they are convinced that new doctrinal trends render an old
precedent obsolete. The same is true in circuit precedent. Often the two
problems intersect and a judge must decide if intervening Supreme Court
law has rendered circuit precedent no longer viable.'0 9
108 At this point, it is worthwhile to spell out how this seemingly abstract discussion
relates to the way in which advocates should shape their arguments before a circuit court.
Without unduly belittling the role of circuit precedent, it should be obvious that reliance on
the existence of helpful precedent will not always be enough to carry the day. Stare decisis
does create a presumption-but it is quite rebuttable. Judges have the ability to use
precedent in a myriad of ways. This ability, when coupled with the judge's omnipresent duty
to reconsider precedent they no longer consider correct, present the advocate with the
burden of demonstrating that the principle embodied in the precedents is indeed the best
way of dealing with the problem before the court.
When dealing with Supreme Court precedent, the advocate can usually be quite secure if
she can point to a case, or better yet, cases that control. Even then, however, an aggressive
circuit panel may decide to treat the precedent in a manner that is not readily perceived by
all as consistent with the principles embodied in it. Thus, even when a Supreme Court case
seems on point, the advocate should resist the temptation to rely solely on what she thinks
the law is, but should give the judges the benefit of the advocate's view of what the law
should be.
'o9 For example, the D.C. Circuit is currently wrestling with the question of the extent
to which the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), undercuts a
line of cases in the circuit allowing Bivens damages in actions by civil service employees
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In all these endeavors, judges have fine lines to draw between advanc-
ing their own legal agendas and maintaining the stability of circuit
law.110 According to one commentator: "Judicial decisions do make policy.
We all know that, but they do so within decisions of the past as obligatory
starting points--even if they end up disavowing one or more of those
decisions.""'
Although a judge's personal philosophy will shape the lines he draws,
"the effect should be felt at the margins of decisionmaking within
against their employers. In Borrell v. International Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981,
990 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the court held that a federal employee whose only recourse under the
civil service scheme was to file a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel could
maintain a Bivens action because her "limited statutory remedy ... is not an adequate
substitute" for a Bivens action. In Bush, the Court conceded that civil service remedies did
not specifically preclude Bivens actions, but nonetheless concluded that the availability of
extensive administrative remedies was a "special factor counselling against the judicial
recognition of a damages remedy under the Constitution in [the federal employment]
context." 462 U.S. at 372-73.
Because extensive civil service remedies were available to the employee in Bush, the
Court did not address the availability of Bivens actions to federal employees with fewer
remedies such as Borrell-whose only resort is to the Office of Special Counsel. Id. at 378
n.14, 385 n.28. So far, this circuit has managed to treat Borrell as viable circuit precedent
without squarely deciding how it interacts with Bush. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Devine, 771
F.2d 1515, 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(citing Borrell for the proposition that the Office of Special
Counsel is not an adequate forum for Constitutional claims, but is in a case not involving any
such claims); Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701,712-13 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(barring a Bivens action
in light of Bush, but distinguishing Borrell because plaintiff Krodel could make use of
comprehensive statutory remedies). The court has recently been squarely presented with
this question in two Bivens actions brought by employees whose only administrative
remedy was to petition the Office of Special Counsel. In one case, the panel concluded that
Bush effectively overruled Borrell and that an employee whose remedy was limited to the
Office of Special Counsel could have no recourse to a Bivens action. Hubbard v. EPA, 809
F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In the other case, a differently constituted panel distinguished
Borrell from Bush and held that an appeal to the Office of Special Counsel was not
"constitutionally adequate" under Bush and that therefore, an employee whose remedy was
limited to the Office of Special Counsel could bring a Bivens action. Spagnola v. Mathis, 809
F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Recognizing that their holdings were irreconcilable, the two panels
sua sponte suggested that the issue be reconsidered en banc. The full court voted to vacate
the conflicting portions of the panel opinions and to rehear the Bivens issue en banc. 809
F.2d 16, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
lO See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 7, at 219 ("judicial decisionmakers should accommodate
change within a framework of stability provided by precedent and accepted patterns of
societal interaction"). Cf. R. POSNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 481 (2d ed. 1977)("admin-
istrative adjudication is far less consistent over time than judicial" partly because
"precedent plays a smaller role in administrative than in judicial decisionmaking").
ill Bennett, supra note 7, at 219. This is not to say that there is no room for legitimate
movement: "Every practicing lawyer knows that the judgment of human beings-the
judgment ofjuries, the judgment of administrators, and the judgment ofjudges-determines
the precise meaning of our law as it is applied in countless situations." Stevens, supra note
8, at 5.
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institutionally constrained behavior."'112 The appointment of a new
majority of judges in a circuit in only a few years can strain that
accommodation. Under such circumstances, normal tensions increase. I
think it is too early to say yet how well we or other courts similarly
situated will contain them. Justice Holmes' position was that "the proper
derivation of general principles in both common and constitutional
law... arise gradually, in the emergence of a consensus from a multitude
of particularized prior decisions."' 113 As they enter the judicial system,
new judges, however impatient or different in ideology from their
predecessors, should be acutely aware how dependent the future stability
and integrity of the law is upon the restraint that Holmes counsels.
112 Bennett, supra note 7, at 221.
"' Kellog, Law, Morals and Justice Holmes, 69 JUDICATURE 214 (1986).
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